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FALL, 1965

No. 1

CURRENT TRENDS IN RELIEF UNDER CLAYTON
ACT SECTION 7
By THOMAS F. DALY*
The American economy is experiencing the third great wave
of mergers in its history. The number of mergers, measured from
1948 to 1964, has reached new levels. Concentration of ownership
of industrial assets in the hands of the biggest firms may have
reached very large proportions.' At the current rate of increase,
"by 1975," according to one estimate, "the 200 largest corporations
of the total assets of American manuwould control two-thirds
'2
facturing corporations."
* LL.B., 1927, Columbia Univ. Sch. of Law; member, New York and
New Jersey Bars; member, Attorney General's National Committee to Study
the Antitrust Laws; partner, Lord, Day & Lord, New York City; fellow,
American College of Trial Lawyers and American Bar Foundation.
1. The first wave occurred around the turn of the century. See Bok,
Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74
One authority has calculated that by 1909
HARV. L. REV. 226, 228-29 (1960).
the 100 largest industrial corporations controlled some 17.7% of the assets of
all industrial corporations. See Mueller, Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 502 (1965).
The second wave occurred in the late 1920's. See Bok, supra at 230.
Concentration, in one sense, may have been well advanced at the very
beginning of the third wave. "[I]n 1964 ... one-tenth of one per cent of
the total number of all American corporations-the giant firms with assets
of $100,000,000 and over- owned 49 per cent of the assets [of] all American
corporations. . . ." S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950). The
current wave seems to involve the greatest number of mergers and probably
in absolute terms the largest amount of money. In relative terms, however,
the trusts put together around the turn of the century probably represent
the high tide of concentration. This is especially true in the key industries
of steel, oil, wet process corn milling and sugar.
2. Mueller, Hearings on Antitrust, supra note 1, at 519. There is considerable dispute, however, as to whether concentration in American indusy is increasing. For a view that no such trend is perceptible, see Bok,
.-pra note 1, at 232-33. For a middle view see Heilbroner, The Power of
iiig Business, ATLANTIC 89 (September 1965).
The debate has been fueled by scholarly exchanges about the reliability
of census figures. See, e.g., Conklin & Goldstein, Census Principles of
Industry and Product Classification,Manufacturing Industries, in BUSINESS
CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 15 (1955); Frabricant, Kottke & Suits,
Comments, in BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 36 (1955). And
it has been "enlivened," if not enlightened, by rival vocabularies of
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Early mergers in a loosely-organized market may appear to be
entirely legal. But a wave tends to be cumulative. If a race for
desirable acquisitions develops among competing firms, a looselyorganized market may turn concentrated very rapidly. As the
structure of the entire market changes, every future and each
past acquisition becomes more vulnerable to antitrust attack.
This is a kind of guilt by association.8
During the largest part of the current wave, the enforcement
agencies, faced with the uncertain standards of amended section 7
of the Clayton Act 4 and armed with limited resources, proceeded
against only a fraction of one per cent of the acquisitions recorded. 5
This is, however, far from an accurate gauge of the vulnerability
of many transactions.6 After more than a decade of case by case
interpretation, section 7 has proved a very potent weapon against
concentration. Hence, problems of relief are likely to become
increasingly important.
Issues of relief may also influence corporate planning. The
largest part of a prospective acquisition may be entirely conglomerate, but some part may have possible anti-competitive consequences. Consideration should be given to whether any vulnerable part of the proposed transaction can be voluntarily
divested or otherwise immunized before the transaction is com7
pleted.
measures of concentration.

See, e.g., Miller, Measures of Monopoly Power

and Concentration: Their Economic Significance, in BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 119 (1955); Rosenbluth, Measures of Concentration, in BusiNEss CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 57 (1955); Scitovsky,
Economic Theory and the Measurement of Concentration, in BusINEss
CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 101 (1955). The real question is whether
the cost of efficient entry is impeded by the fact of existing concentration.
See generally BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION (1956).
3. See United States v. Alcoa, 377 U.S. 271, 279 n. 6 (1964)
4. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (1958). The amended section provides in part:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or
indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital
and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create
a monopoly.
5. BOCK, MERGERS AND MARKET: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
1964 SUPREME COURT MERGER DECISIONS 9 (4th ed. 1965).
6. E.g., United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586
(1957) ("duPont I").
7. See United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316,
330-31 (1961) ("duPont I"),
which seems to imply that divestiture of the
entire transaction would be regarded as the usual remedy if any part was
bad. There is, however, a strong suggestion in Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 337 n.65 (1962), that relief may be confined to the
offending part of the transaction. Compare General Outdoor Advertising
Co. v. Gamble, 1961 Trade Cas. t 70,137 (D. Minn. 1961).
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Issues of relief may also help to resolve a serious problem in
public policy: how is it possible to avoid the consequences of
excessive industrial concentration without at the same time banning mergers which would promote efficiency or increase competition?" The Sherman Act 9 merger cases decided prior to 1950
provided a less than adequate answer to the problem of concentration. 10 Perhaps this explains why the Supreme Court has given
amended section 7 a very blunt interpretation. To elaborate a
little, a monopoly achieved by buying out competitors can at some
point be stopped by section 2 of the Sherman Act. The Sherman
Act, however, requires at the least a demonstration that defendant
deliberately acquired some power over price or over new entry. 1
No one doubts that section 7 of the Clayton Act can be used to
interrupt such a program long before a full-blown Sherman Act
section 2 violation could be found. 1 2 If this is the only role of
amended section 7, it would differ from section 2 of the Sherman
Act simply in the nature of the proof required to show a violation.
The key question remains the same: does the acquisition tend to
increase power over price and over new entry? Section 2, however, may never apply to a market which becomes concentrated as
the result of parallel acquisition programs by several competitors,
each increasing in size at roughly the same rate and no one of
which has any decisive power over price or over new entry. 13 If
section 7 was also intended to prevent industry-wide concentration, then either a very much more, or very much less, sophisti4
cated kind of economic analysis is required.
In practice, the courts and the Federal Trade Commission
have inclined to interpret section 7 as prohibiting simply further
concentration by any significant factor in an already concentrated
market. Proof of strong remaining competition is not necessarily
a complete defense.' 5 The inquiry posed reduces to a simple one:
is an acquisition likely to increase the level of concentration be-

8. See, e.g., Bork & Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM.
L. REV. 363 (1965).

9.

26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 69 Stat. 282 (1955),

15 U.S.C.

§§ 1-7 (1964).
10. E.g., United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
11. Compare Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905),
with United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 431-32 (2d
Cir. 1945).
12. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 318 n.32 (1962).
13. But see Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of

Progress, 14 U. Cm. L. REV. 567 (1947).
Compare Rostow, Monopoly
Under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose? 43 ILL. L. REV. 745 (1949),
with Johnston & Stevens, Monopoly or Monopolization - A Reply to Prolessor Rostow, 44 ILL. L. REV. 269 (1949).
Compare RosTow, PLANNING
FOR FREEDOM 300 (1959).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Alcoa, 377 U.S. 271, 280 (1964).

15.

E.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576

(S.D.N.Y. 1958); Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 555 (1953).
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yond a more or less arbitrary peril point?16 Beyond the crude
task of defining the area within which concentration is to be
measured, market analysis as practiced by the courts and the FTC
has so far contributed very little light. Thus, a leading case resurrected an old rule of per se invalidity originally applied to holding
companies acquiring parallel and competing railroads to aid in the
interpretation of amended section 7.17 Market analysis, however,
is the only way in which it may be possible to distinguish mergers
which are likely to promote efficiency from those which will make
market structure more rigid, market conduct that much stickier.
To pose the test of the legality of an acquisition simply in
terms of whether any appreciable amount of present (or potential)
competition is thereby eliminated, short-cuts any attempt to
evolve antitrust standards much beyond a vague bias against concentration and in favor of small business."' In passing on the
legality of a merger, rarely have the courts concerned themselves
with the qualitative considerations posed by asking, what kind of
competition should be encouraged. The connection among market
structure, the likely conduct of a firm within a given structure
and the performance of a firm in contributing to the economy is
increasingly obscured. 19 To be sure, courts are in the business of
deciding cases, not of advancing economic theory. On the other
16. The schizophrenic aspect of section 7 standards was early made
clear, e.g., Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 50 F.T.C. at 571-73, when the FTC sent the
case back to the Hearing Examiner to examine all "relevant facts," cautioning that proof of strong remaining competition might be no defense.
See, e.g., United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp.
867 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
17. United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 376 U.S. 665, 669-73 (1964).
18. See Bok, supra note 1, at 233-38. How much concentration is "too
much?" See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 364 &
n.41 (1963) (30% is undue concentration). The flight from analysis in § 7
cases and the resort to per se theories under § 1 is the same tendency at
work under Sherman Act § 2. There private parties and the Justice Department seek to give a per se gloss by fastening upon the theory that
when a company attempts to monopolize, it will not be permitted to defend on the ground that the market dominated is insignificant. The theory
goes back to United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377,
395 n.23 (1956), and perhaps to United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S.
218 (1947).
See Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70
HARV. L. REV. 281, 294 (1956). The theory was adopted in Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 474-75 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993
(1964). Contra, American Football League v. National Football League,
205 F. Supp. 60, 64-65 (D. Md. 1964), aff'd, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963).
For the view that the standards of market analysis should be the same for
Sherman Act § 2 and Clayton Act § 7 cases, see Handler & Robinson,

A Decade of Administration of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act, 61
COLUM. L. REV. 629, 643-51 (1961). See generally Note, 50 IOWA L. REV.
1196 (1965).
19. See Procter & Gamble Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1963-1965 Transfer
Binder)
16,673 (FTC 1963). For an indication of the difficulties involved,
see BAiN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 421 (1959).

Fall 1965]

CLAYTON ACT SECTION 7

hand, adoption of standards imperceptibly close to per se rules may
indicate a failure to apply available economic theory. To the extent that law and economics part company, the cost of an antitrust
policy may be unnecessarily heavy. If labels are a convenient-if
sloppy-method of "deciding" legality, they cannot always disguise
the problem of how much competition is to be "restored." Resolution of issues of relief is beginning to give hard content to vague
tests of anti-competitive probabilities.
Mergers are not of course weighed in purely economic terms
by a Board of Industry. The law of section 7 has been worked out
in the cut and thrust of litigation. When a proposed or consummated merger is threatened with attack, a multitude of procedural
problems may be raised. Resolution of these problems will inevitably color substantive standards. A review of current trends
in relief begins with the problem of who can consent or object.
Does the risk of being attacked include treble damage liability,
complicated perhaps by the problem of tolling? How likely is it
that a consummated transaction can be put back to the original
seller? What are the tests as to whether a proposed transaction
can be stopped in its tracks: the problems of preliminary relief
and its interrelationship with final relief? If a merger is attacked,
when should negotiations begin towards settling the case? If
divestiture is not the exclusive remedy, then what are some of the
factors which determine whether some part of the transaction or
after-acquired improvements can be saved? Are any patterns of
relief, from divestiture to injunctive relief, beginning to emerge
in particular types of merger situations? What are some of the
problems of appealability and enforcement procedure? This article will attempt to answer these questions and to essay some conclusions as to the propriety of certain types of relief.
THE CLEARANCE PROGRAM
A threshold question for firms with an acquisition program, is
the extent to which problems of relief may be avoided by resort to
the clearance programs of the enforcement agencies. In response
to complaints that the antitrust laws are vague, both the Justice
Department 20 and the FTC21 have adopted the policy of giving
"clearances" or advisory opinions. When forthcoming, such opinions are helpful; however, they suffer at least two defects. 22 First,
20. See Antitrust Clearance and Release Procedure, Justice Dep't
Press Release, Nov. 1, 1962 (Assistant Attorney General Loevinger);
Loevinger, Antitrust Is Pro-Business,FORTUNE 96, 130-35 (Aug. 1962).

21. 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.51-54 (Supp. 1965).
22. In addition, some feel that advisory opinions should not be given
because there are no adversary proceedings. See Kronstein & Volhard,
Brandeis Before the FTC in 1915: Should Advisory Opinions Be Given?,
24 FED. B. J. 609, 611-13 (1964).

6
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an advisory opinion is not binding on the agency. 23 More important, a favorable opinion is not likely to be forthcoming on
close questions,2 4 when it is most needed. 25 Better not to have
asked than to be met with a refusal to a request for clearance,
since there may be many transactions which would not be cleared
2
but neither would they be promptly attacked, if consummated.
STANDING TO SUE AND RECOVER TREBLE DAMAGES
Who may seek relief? The Justice Department and the FTC
enjoy largely concurrent jurisdiction. Other agencies have jurisdiction over some mergers in regulated industries. 27 Although
companies resisting acquisition, 28 and competitors of 29 or suppliers
23. A clearance letter from the Justice Department usually carries a
disclaimer in the following terms: "It is understood, however, that the
department reserves the right to take action in the future if other evidence
or subsequent developments should warrant it." The reservation of the
right to take future action if other evidence should warrant it contemplates
the possibility that it will later develop that the statement of facts on
which the clearance was given was an incomplete or inaccurate statement
of facts. The reservation of the right to take future action if "subsequent
developments should warrant it," contemplates the possibility that the
company receiving the clearance letter later engages in activities violative
of the antitrust laws. For example, a subsequent acquisition would constitute a sufficient change in circumstances to relieve the Justice Department of any inhibition it might feel about reviewing the first transation
ab initio.
24. In the present state of the substantive law, even a relatively small
merger in a concentrated industry could present close questions.
25. In fairness, it should be added that the FTC staff tries to suggest
alternative methods of achieving the desired result which could be recommended for adoption by the FTC.
26. Jacobs, Merger Clearance Problems, 2 ANnmuST BULL. 187, 193
(1956).
27. Some administrative agencies are empowered to administer § 7
by the Clayton Act while other agencies receive authority from their enabling acts. See generally Levi, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the
Regulated Industries, How TO COMPLY WITH THE CLAYTON ACT (1959 New
York State Bar Assoc. Antitrust Symposium) 136 (1959).
Some agencies
also have primary jurisdiction over certain mergers and acquisitions. E.g.,
Agreement No. 8555 Between Isbrandtsen S.S. Co., Isbrandtsen Co. and
American Export Lines, Inc., 7 F.M.C. 15 (1961). (Federal Maritime Commission has primary jurisdiction over consolidation of competing carriers).
Cf. California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962). Anti-competitive consequences
are only one factor to be considered under the doctrine of McLean Trucking
Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944). Compare Florida E. Coast R.R. v.
United States, 242 F. Supp. 14 (M.D. Fla. 1965), appeal filed September 10,
1965.
28. E.g., American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co.,
259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958); Briggs Mfg. Co. v. Crane Co., 185 F. Supp. 177
(E.D. Mich. 1960), aff'd, 280 F.2d 747 (6th Cir. 1960); E. L. Bruce Co. v.
Empire Millwork Corp., 164 F. Supp. 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Hamilton Watch
Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307 (D. Conn. 1953), aff'd, 206 F.2d
738 (2d Cir. 1953).
29. E.g., Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing
Co., 381 U.S. 311 (1965), affirming 332 F.2d 346 (3d Cir. 1964).
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tos° or purchasers from,8 ' the acquired and the acquiring company
have standing to seek injunctive relief-and perhaps even divestiture3 2 -there are many unanswered questions. Do suppliers to"3
or purchasers from3 4 arguably affected competitors have standing?
According to decisions in other antitrust contexts where courts
typically try to arrive at inflexible categories of those directly
enough injured to have standing,3 5 it would seem that they have
no standing. A more practical answer would seem to be that the
question of injury, and therefore of standing, depends simply
on the range of firms in a market over which an acquisition
might be expected
to provide a competitive edge, i.e., who is
"aimed at? '3, Moreover, there is a flat conflict as to whether
any private party may sue for treble damages.
Any person injured "in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws" is entitled to recover
treble damages. 37 It was long assumed38 that a treble damage
action could be grounded upon a violation of section 7, but lately
30. E.g., Castlegate, Inc. v. National Tea Co., 34 F.R.D. 221, 232-35 (D.
Col. 1963). Compare Smith-Victor Corp. v. Sylvania Elec. Prod., Inc., 242
F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
31. See Bender v. Hearst Corp., 263 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1959), as explained in Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 521, 525
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
32. Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., supra note 31; Bailey's Bakery
Ltd. v. Continental Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705, 717 (D. Hawaii 1964).
Cf. American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp.
387, 400-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958). But cf.
Schrader v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 1955 Trade Cas.
68,217 (E.D.Pa.
1955).
33. Compare Snow Crest Beverages v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp.
907, 909 (D. Mass. 1956), criticized in Congress Bldg. Corp. v. Loew's Inc.,
246 F.2d 587, 592 (7th Cir. 1957).
34. Compare Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323
F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1963); Ace Beer Distrib., Inc. v. Kohn, Inc., 318 F.2d 283
(6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963).
35. E.g., Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 Fed. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910).
36. E.g., Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51
(9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
37. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
38. See, e.g., Merge Foreign Car Div., Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 1960
Trade Cas.
69,678 (W.D. Pa. 1960) (sustaining treble damage complaint
under § 7 by retail dealer concerning Chrysler's acquisition of 25% of the
stock of a foreign car manufacturer); see Union Leader Corp. v. Newspaper
of New England, Inc., 284 F.2d 582, 588-90 (1st Cir. 1960) (upholding theory
of a treble damage complaint while finding insufficient proof of violation).
Cf. New Grant-Patten Milk Co. v. Happy Valley Farms, Inc., 222 F. Supp
319 (E.D. Tenn. 1963) (sustaining defendant's motion for partial summary
judgment on failure to allege any causal connection between the violation
and the injury alleged).
There were several earlier cases which recognized a private treble damage claim under § 7 in the context of shareholders' derivative suits. E.g.,
Ramsburg v. American Inv. Co. of Ill., 231 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1956). See
generally Blake, Shareholders Role in Antitrust Enforcement, 110 U. PA.
L. REV. 143 (1961).
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considerable doubt has arisen. This is mainly due to some confusion about the causal connection between an illegal acquisition
and plaintiff's injury.
In Gottesman v. General Motors Corp.,39 several General Motors stockholders sought treble damages against duPont and General Motors under both the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Finding
no earlier authority, the court denied the possibility of money
damages on the section 7 count, 40 reasoning that section 7 is available against merely potential restraints. Again, in Bailey's Bakery
Ltd. v. Continental Baking Co., 41 acknowledging that a competitor
may be entitled to injunctive relief or even diverstiture, the court
dismissed on the pleadings the damage count in an action by a
small island baker challenging the 1960 purchase by the largest
mainland baker of the leading Hawaiian baker:
The prohibitory sanctions of Clayton § 7 are triggered
to explode by and at the moment of acquisition. That,
after the moment of acquisition, subsequent business practices do injure competitors in that market does not, because of those subsequent injurious acts, give rise to a
claim for treble damages under Clayton § 7.42
Denial of any right to treble damages should on this theory be
equally true of section 3 cases, but the courts have granted treble
43
damage recovery in such suits.
Gottesman was the worst context-a very substantial stock
acquisition 40 years old-in which to recognize only a potentiality
of injury. Where a merger is attacked before it is consummated,
it is hard to see how damages could be established. It seems rash,
however, to state dogmatically that section 7 can never bear the
weight of a damage claim. Gottesman did not question the treble
damages claim alleged under the Sherman Act. 44 The court could
equally well have held that plaintiffs' burden in establishing the
fact of their injury under section 7 required something more than
the probability that duPont's control of General Motors might
45
substantially lessen competition.
The Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co. 46 litigation
39. 221 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), leave to appeal denied, (unreported opinion Jan. 31, 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 882 (1964), petition for
rehearing pending.
40. 221 F. Supp. at 493.
41. 235 F. Supp. 705 (D. Hawaii 1964).
42. Id. at 716-17.
43. E.g., Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir.
1955).

44.

Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 221 F. Supp. at 490.

45.

Compare Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp., 340 F.2d 753, 768-

69 (6th Cir. 1965) (executory part of contract illegal under Sherman Act
held unenforcible while counterclaim for overcharges on executed part dismissed as too speculative).
46. 327 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1964), reversing on other grounds 221
F. Supp. 15 (E.D. Mo. 1963).
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illustrates the contortions to which a court is led in recognizing a
Sherman Act treble damage claim but not a section 7 claim. In
1963 a florist foil converter brought a private treble damage action
alleging that the 1956 acquisition by Reynolds Metals, one of only
three United States primary aluminum producers, of Arrow
Brands, a florist foil converter competing with plaintiffs, was illegal under section 7. It also alleged a violation of Sherman Act
section 2, based on allegations of predatory price cutting. The
circuit court affirmed the dismissal of the section 7 count:
[A]ny effort to convert Section 7 of the Clayton Act
into a per se violation of the antitrust laws so as to give
rise to a private right of action under the Clayton Act has
been squarely checked by . . . Brown Shoe Co. . . . The
statute deals with clearcut menaces to competition, not
with accomplished monopolies, presently creating damage
to a competitor, which is the sine qua non of a47 private
right of action under Section 5 of the Clayton Act.
It reversed on the Sherman Act count. 48
Highland Supply
amended its complaint, alleging a conspiracy in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 49 The court refused to strike
this complaint. It held that no public injury need be shown. Nor
was the court persuaded that the merger necessarily terminated
any possible conspiracy, and therefore that section 1 could not
apply. On this reasoning, for the purposes of section 7 an acquisition is not a per se violation and is no basis for damages. Under
the (presumably) heavier burden of proof of the Sherman Act,
however, an acquisition is a basis for treble damages and requires
no proof of injury to competition. Then Julius M. Ames Co. v.
Bostitch, Inc.,50 held that treble damages are available under section 7. Denying a motion to dismiss the complaint, the court held
that loss of plaintiff's distributorships is not too speculative a
basis on which to seek damages agaist a merger. Most recently,
in Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing
Co., 51 the Supreme Court has virtually committed itself to the
47. Id. at 728 n.3. The precise ground for affirmance of dismissal of
§ 7 count was that the acquisition had occurred beyond the four year
statute of limitations which was not tolled by the FTC proceedings. But
see text accompanying note 54, infra.
48. Id. at 729.
49. Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 238 F. Supp. 561
(E.D: Mo. 1965).

50. 240 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
51. 381 U.S. 311 (1965). But see Highland Supply Corp v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 1965 Trade Cas.
71,561 (E.D. Mo. 1965) (rejecting the tacit

recognition of a private right to treble damages under § 7):
It is clear that the Minnesota Mining decision does not rule on
the issue before this Court. The complaint in that case included alleged Sherman Act violations, as well as the § 7 Clayton violation.
The Supreme Court narrowly limited its ruling to the issue of tolling the statute of limitations.
Id. at 81,560.
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Ames approach.
TOLLING

A Government antitrust proceeding can be an important aid to
a private antitrust case. At the least the Government will have
sketched out a theory of antitrust violation. At the most a private
plaintiff may be able to introduce a litigated finding of illegality
as prima facie evidence of the violation in his own case. 52 To give
the private plaintiff full opportunity to see how the Government
fares, Clayton Act section 5(b) suspends the running of the limitation period "whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the United States" to stop violations of any of the antitrust laws. 53 Does this extend to FTC proceedings as well as to
cases instituted by the Justice Department? This question has
recently been settled by the United States Supreme Court in
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.
New Jersey Wood sued Minnesota Mining in 1961, alleging
that shortly after Minnesota Mining's 1956 acquisition of plaintiff's principal U.S. distributor, the distributor dropped its line.
Against the motion to dismiss the claims under both Clayton section 7 and the Sherman Act as barred after four years, 54 New
Jersey Wood successfully argued below 55 that the statute had been
tolled under Clayton Act section 5(b) by a prior FTC section 7
proceeding. 56 On appeal, defendant based its argument on the
premise that a litigated FTC decree would not qualify under
Clayton section 5(a) as prima facie evidence of a violation.57 A
fortiori, the argument ran, an FTC proceeding settled by consent
cannot toll the time under section 5(b) within which suit must
be brought.5
The majority of the court would not assume the
premise. Whether an FTC final order is covered by section 5(a)
and may therefore be prima facie evidence in a private action was
a question left open.5 9 Finding these two sections not "wholly
52. Clayton Act § 5(a), 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 69 Stat. 283
(1955), 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964).
53. Clayton Act § 5(b), 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 69 Stat. 283
(1955), 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964).
54. Clayton Act § 4B,69 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1964).

55. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co.,
216 F. Supp. 507 (D.N.J. 1963), aff'd, 332 F.2d 346 (3d Cir. 1964).
56. See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. TRADE REG. REP. (1961-1963
Transfer Binder)

15,360 (FTC 1961).

57. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co.,
381 U.S. 311 (1965).
58. Id. at 317.
59. Ibid. The argument would extend to FTC proceedings to enforce
Clayton § 3 and § 7 and the Robinson-Patman amendment. Thus, it
would probably not reach Sherman Act situations attacked under Federal
Trade Commission Act § 5. The FTC has no powers to enforce the Sherman Act directly. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act allows
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interdependent," the majority held that the benefits of tolling are
not limited to decrees admissible as evidence: Section 5(b) is
tolled by a proceeding whether a decree is entered or not.60
Congress clearly desired to give private parties the benefits of
prior government actions. The majority thought it would be
illogical to draw a distinction on the basis of the accident of
which enforcement agency had instituted the prior action."
Thus, "the limitation provision of § 4(b) is tolled by Commission
proceedings to the same extent and in the same circumstances
as it is by Justice Department actions. '6 2
STATUS OF THE ACQUIRED COMPANY

The thrust of section 7 is directed against the transaction, not
against the moving party as such. The role of intent or motive is
unclear except where an acquisition is alleged to have been made
only for investment.63 A section 7 complaint brought by the Justice Department before a merger has been consummated, names
both the acquiring and the acquired companies as co-defendants.
To the company resisting a takeover, there may be some advanthe FTC to enforce the Sherman Act indirectly. See FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 689-93 (1948).
Section 5 is not defined as one of the
"antitrust laws" recited in Clayton section 1 and therefore cannot be used
to invoke relief under either § 4 or § 16 of the Clayton Act which create a
private right to injunctive relief and treble damages. See Moore v. New
York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 603 (1926); but see BNA, ANTITRUST AND
TRADE REG. REP.

No. 208, at B-4.

(July 6, 1965).

Proper v. John Bene & Sons, 295 Fed. 729 (E.D.N.Y. 1923), announced
six requirements that a prior judgment must meet before it can be introduced into evidence in a subsequent private action under § 5:
(1) the judgment or decree must be final. (2) It must have
been rendered in a criminal prosecution or in a suit or proceeding
in equity. (3) The prosecution, suit, or proceeding must have been
brought by or on behalf of the United States. (4) It must have
been instituted under the anti-trust laws. (5) It must be to the
effect that a defendant has violated those laws.
(6) It shall be
prima facie evidence against that defendant.
Id. at 731-32. The first objection has been remedied by the 1959 Finality
Amendment to the Clayton Act. 73 Stat. 243 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1964).
Another objection may be added to Proper: The FTC, as an administrative
agency, is not bound by the usual rules of evidence, e.g., hearsay may be
admissible.
60. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co.,
1965 Trade Cas. 71,449, at 80,968-69.
61. Id. at 80,970.
62. Ibid.
63. Compare Webster, The Clayton Act Today: Merger and Marketing,
How TO COMPLY WITH THE CLAYTON ACT (1959 New York State Bar Ass'n
Antitrust Symposium) 74, 87 (1959) (motive is not relevant except on the
rare issue of the investment defense), with Mr. Chief Justice Warren in
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 329 n.48 (1962) (motive
evidence indicates the purpose of the merging parties and is an aid in predicting the future conduct of the parties and the effects of the merger).
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tages 64 in being joined as a defendant:65 it will have a voice in
framing any decree and it may cross-claim. 66 For the Justice Department, the move may solve venue problems. It is not clear,
however, that a court will be any more inclined to grant an
injunction to the Government than to a company protesting a raid.
When a firm sells an asset or a group of stockholders vote to
sell their corporation, does their liability under section 7 cease
after the transaction has been consummated? It might be supposed, especially if the consideration for the transaction were
cash, that there would be no occasion to pursue the seller. Sellers, however, have been named parties defendant even after the
transaction has been consummated. 67 This implies that an acquisition can be reversed. The difficulties of locating the stockholders of a dissolved company will argue strongly against such
relief. Where the transaction, however, involves only certain assets and the selling corporation survives, the Justice Department
feels free to ask that the assets be "put" back to the seller.68 In
Farm Journal, Inc.,69 the Hearing Examiner ordered lists of magazine subscribers and advertisers returned to the selling corporation, and the FTC affirmed.
PRELIMINARY

RELIEF AND INJUNCTIONS

Preliminary relief is interrelated with final relief.

For some

acquisitions these problems will be as important, if not more so,
than those of final relief.

If allowed a free hand for the several

years that litigation may take, some firms would be quite willing
to make a short term investment. Once an inexpensive investment
has been rehabilitated or valuable experience gained, the acquiring
company would not be unduly distressed to have to divest, pre64. There may, however, be some disadvantages. If the suit is settled
by consent decree, may the decree be used in a subsequent action by one
co-defendant against the other? If the company resisting a raid is named

defendant, may a consent decree be used against it years later if the company initiates a merger? Consent decrees have been admitted, for example,

to show defendant's past proclivity for unlawful behavior. See Milgrim v.
Loew's Inc., 192 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1951).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., Civil No. 1378-60
PH, S.D. Cal., April 11, 1961, where it is understood that Union Oil, fearing
its acquisition by Phillips, was made a defendant to give it the status of a

party without departing from the Justice Department's policy against private intervention in a government antitrust suit, and the court denied the
motion of cross-claimant Phillips to strike or dismiss the cross-claim of
codefendant Union.
148 (E.D.Pa. 1952).

66.

Contra, United States v. Krasnov, 109 F. Supp. 143,

Ibid.

67. E.g., United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 183 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Wis.
1960). For a critical view of this approach, see Handler, Annual Review of
Antitrust Development, 15 RECORD 362, 386-87 (1960).
68. Orrick, The Antitrust Division's Enforcement Program,TRADE REG.
REP. (1965 New York State Bar Ass'n. Antitrust Symposium) 31-38 (1965).
69. Farm Journal, Inc., 53 FTC 26 (1956).
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sumably at a profit. But what is the likelihood of a temporary
injunction? Moreover, there may be situations in which, if no
preliminary relief is granted, no serious relief, for all practical
7
purposes, can be granted at all. 0
The different statutory clauses empowering the Justice Department, 71 on the one hand, and private parties72 on the other,
to seek a temporary injunction appear to require both to show
likelihood that defendant has violated one of the "antitrust
laws. '7 3 By the literal terms of the statute a private plaintiff
must go further: it must establish the threat of irreparable
injury and post a bond against the possibility that the relief
proves to have been improvidently granted.74 As interpreted in
section 7 context, however, the tests applicable to the respective
burdens of the Justice
Department and private plaintiffs have
75
tended to coalesce.
Whether plaintiff be the Justice Department or private party,
70. Query, would not the dissolution of a wasting asset corporation,
such as an oil producer, following sale of its properties to a number of
buyers make ultimate reconstitution extremely difficult? But see United
States v. Standard Oil Co., 1961 Trade Cas. 70,131 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
71. See Clayton Act § 15, 38 Stat. 736 (1914), as amended, 62 Stat..909
(1948), 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1964). The FTC has no express statutory right to
a preliminary injunction to restrain mergers pending their determination
of its legality. The FTC may not avail itself of the All-Writs Statute, 62
Stat. 944 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1964). FTC v. International Paper
Co., 241 F.2d 372, 373 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Contra, Federal Reserve Sys. v. Transamerica Corp., 184 F.2d 311, 315-16 (9th Cir. 1950). See also A.G. Spalding
& Bros., Inc., 56 FTC 1125, 1126 (1960) (FTC asked circuit court to preserve
status quo of acquired company). FTC has refused to acquiesce to the
International Paper rule. See Ekco Prod. Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1963-1965
Transfer Binder)
16,879, at 21,905 n.10 (FTC 1964). It has been suggested
that the Justice Department may be requested to seek a preliminary injunction on FTC's behalf. See BuRNs, A STUDY OF THE ANTITRUST LAws 321
(1958). FTC has apparently never made this request because it is simpler
to send the whole file over to the Justice Department. The FTC has filed
a brief amicus curiae on behalf of a company allegedly threatened with a
take-over which was seeking an injunction. Briggs Mfg. Co. v. Crane Co.,
185 F. Supp. 177, 179 (E.D. Mich. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 280 F.2d 747 (6th
Cir. 1960).
72. See Clayton Act § 16, 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1964).
73. See Clayton Act § 1, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1964),
defining the "antitrust laws" to include the Clayton Act.
74. The bonds required have been quite modest. See Muskegan Piston
Ring Co. v. Gulf & W. Indust. Inc., 328 F.2d 830 (6th Cir.. 1964) ($10,000);
Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 739 (2d Cir. 1953)
($10,000); Vanadium Corp. of America v. Susquehanna Corp., 203 F. Supp.

686, 698 (D. Del. 1962)

($50,000); General Outdoor Advertising Co. v.

Gamble, 1961 Trade Cas.
70,137, at 78,538 (D. Minn. 1961) ($25,000).
75. Contrast the reasoning, but compare the results, in one of the
leading cases on the standards of private relief, Hamilton Watch Co. v.
Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953), aff'g, 114 F. Supp. 307 (D.
Conn. 1953), and the leading case on the standards applicable to the
Justice Department applications for preliminary relief, United States v.
Brown Shoe Co., 1956 Trade Cas. 68,244 (E.D. Mo. 1956).
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the burden of making out a violation is clearly satisfied on a
prima facie showing of illegality. 6 Is such a finding necessary
to support a temporary injunction?77 There appears to be a split
in the circuits as to whether the test, both for public and private
suits, is proof of likelihood of violation, or simply raising "doubts"
serious and substantial enough to provide fair ground for full78
scale trial.
As to the issue of irreparable injury, temporary injunctions
are almost invariably granted, even with comparatively trivial
proof, in private actions brought by a company resisting acquisition. 79 Hardship seems readily made out when a company threatened with acquisition wishes to continue to compete with the acquiring company. By contrast, conclusory allegations of probable
injury to competition appear generally insufficient to tilt the
balance of hardship sufficiently against defendants so as to support
an injunction sought by the Government.8 0 Only when the Government can show some real obstacle to ultimate divestiture as
well as a probable violation is it likely to get preliminary relief.
It is an overstatement to say that preliminary relief may always be as extensive as final relief. Temporary relief, however,
has at times gone a long way toward suspending the normal incidents of stock ownership and in regulating the day to day affairs
of business. Thus defendants have been enjoined from acquiring
76. United States v. Chrysler Corp., 232,F. Supp. 651, 655-56 (D.N.J.
1964) (preliminary injunction granted); cf. United States v. FMC Corp.,
218 F. Supp. 817, 823 (N.D. Cal. 1963) (denying motion for preliminary

injunction); United States v. Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, 223 F. Supp. 849
(N.D. Cal. 1963) (denying motion).
77. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 740 (2d
Cir. 1953).

78. Contrast the second circuit view of Benrus, supra note 77, with the
third circuit view as represented by United States v. Aluminum Ltd., 1965

Trade Cas.

71,366 (D.N.J. 1965).
79. E.g., Vanadium Corp. of America v. Susquehanna Corp. 203 F.
Supp. 686 (D. Del. 1962) (temporary injunction granted); General Outdoor
Advertising Co. v. Gamble, 1961 Trade Cas. 70,137 (D. Minn. 1961); Briggs
Mfg. Co. v. Crane Co., 185 F. Supp. 177 (E.D. Mich. 1960), aff'd, 280 F.2d
747 (6th Cir. 1960); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp.
307 (D. Conn. 1953), aff'd, 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953) (temporary injunc-

tion granted).

But cf. American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American

Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir.

1958) (after trial on merits a permanent injunction was granted although
the district court declined to order divestiture of the acquired stock);
American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 143 F. Supp. 100
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) (preliminary injunction denied for failure to show irreparable damage or clear violation).
80. E.g., United States v. Continental Can Co., 1956 Trade Cas. 68,479

(S.D.N.Y. 1956).

But compare United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp.,

169 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (granting partial preliminary injunction)
with United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153, 203 (S.D.

N.Y. 1960) (complaint dismissed on merits after trial).
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any more stock and from soliciting proxies; 8 ' their voting power
has been redefined8 2 or even suspended; 3 and they have simply
been enjoined from acquiring representation on the board of
directors of their investment. 84 The buyers to whom stock already acquired might be sold have been circumscribed. 85 One
trial court ordered dividends on the investment to be paid over to
the clerk of the court.8 6 A brokerage firm protesting that the
preliminary injunction against voting shares in its name would
disenfranchise innocent customers was told that such customers
assumed that risk by carrying stock in the broker's name.8 7 Officers and directors of the prospective acquired company, although
not all individually parties to the suit, have been enjoined from
selling any of their shares to any other corporation or encouraging
any stockholder to make such sale. 8 8 The prospective acquired
company has been enjoined from merging with any other company. 89 A wide range of usual business activities have been regulated. 90
In United States v. Brown Shoe Co.,9' the challenged merger
depended on economic and stock market factors, then favorable
but conceivably impossible by the time of a final judgment. If a
preliminary injunction were granted, and final judgment held the
merger legal after all, the Government would have won "the
victory in fact but not on the record. ' '92 The court denied a preliminary injunction as such. To insure possible divestiture, however, the court did order a conditional temporary injunction, a
form of relief since known as a Brown Shoe order. It allowed the
merger, if approved by the stockholders, to be carried out so long
as the acquired property was run as an insulated subsidiary. 93
81. E.g., Muskegan Piston Ring Co. v. Gulf & W. Indust. Inc., 328 F.2d
830 (6th Cir. 1964).
82. Ibid.
83. E.g., Vanadium Corp. of America v. Susquehanna Corp., 203 F.
Supp. 686, 697-98 (D. Del. 1962); Briggs Mfg. Co. v. Crane Co., 185 F. Supp.
177, 186 (E.D. Mich. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 280 F.2d 747 (6th Cir. 1960).
84. E.g., Vanadium Corp. of America v. Susquehanna Corp., 203 F.
Supp. 686, 697-98 (D. Del. 1962).
85. E.g., General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, 1961

Trade Cas. %70,137 (D. Minn. 1961).
86. See Muskegan Piston Ring Co. v. Gulf & W. Indust., Inc., 328 F.2d
830 (6th Cir. 1964) (striking this requirement).
87. Vanadium Corp. of America v. Susquehanna Corp., 203 F. Supp.
686, 698-99 (D.Del. 1962).
88.

Muskegan Piston Ring Co. v. Gulf & W. Indust., Inc., 328 F.2d

830 (6th Cir. 1964).
89.

Ibid.

90. See, e.g., United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 1962 Trade
Cas.

70,380 (W.D.N.Y. 1962), modified

1963 Trade Cas.

70,693 (W.D.N.Y.

1963).
91. 1956 Trade Cas. 68,244 (E.D. Mo. 1956).
92. Id. at 71,116.
93. Contra, United States v. Standard Oil Co., 1965 Trade Cas. 71,503
(D.N.J. 1965) (denying defendants' motion, after trial but before final
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Once an acquisition is consummated, it is beyond the power of
the trial court to issue a preliminary injunction against the transaction.9 4 But "interim" injunctions have been granted to enjoin
threatened changes in the status quo after the acquisition has been
consummated 5 Again, the range of regulations imposed on day
to day business activities has been very broad.9 6 This seems entirely appropriate when there is real danger of a disposition of the
acquired assets not justified by usual commercial practices which
might preclude effective relief. When no such "dissipation" is involved, should a competitor be insulated from exposure to a
nearby plant which would eliminate, if allowed to open, much of
his transportation cost advantage throughout a large section of
the country? 97
The Government has sought interim relief where it questioned
whether business considerations alone dictated the sale of a plant
involved in section 7 litigation. It sought to enjoin the sale and
the purchase of any more stock, and to forbid dealings between
the two companies. The court allowed the prospective buyer to
intervene to explain the injury it would suffer if it were not
allowed to buy the plant, and denied the motion."
Another
court gave a prospective seller, not named a defendant, the
option of formally intervening or being heard as amicus curiae. 99
The office of a preliminary injunction is to protect the status
quo pending trial and final disposition on the merits. Certainly
some of the interim restraints imposed by the courts themselves
"alter" the status quo of usual business practice. The Justice Department may feel that the very drawbacks of interim or hybrid
argument, to modify the outstanding temporary restraining order so as to
permit the acquisition subject to an order to preserve the "complete integrity" of the acquired company "as a separate, independent corporate

entity free of all control by Jersey.")
94. United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 1954 Trade Cas.

67,659

(D.R.I. 1953); see also Fein v. Security Banknote Co., 157 F. Supp. 146

(S.D.N.Y. 1957). Defendant acts at his peril, however, when the preliminary injunction proceeding is pending. Even when a motion to enjoin
a merger is denied and the merger is completed before appeal is heard, the
appeal is not moot and the transaction may be undone. Ramsburg v.
American Inv. Co., 231 F.2d 333, 336 (7th Cir. 1956).
95. E.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 1960 Trade Cas.
69,727 (N.D.N.Y. 1960).
96. E.g., United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 169 F. Supp. 888,
897 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (limiting additional number of films which might be

sublicensed to 50 in any six month period with leave to defendants to
apply for modification).
97. United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 1962 Trade Cas.
70,380 (W.D.N.Y. 1962), -modified 1963 Trade Cas.
70,693 (W.D.N.Y.

1963).
98. United States v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 1965 Trade Cas.
1 71,452 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).

99. United States v. Aluminum Ltd., 1965 Trade Cas.
1965).

71,366 (D.N.J.
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relief argue for greater liberality in issuing preliminary orders
which flatly enjoin an acquisition. Defendants may wonder
whether the fault does not lie with attacks on cases too weak to
merit outright injunctions, or delaying the time of application to
the point where hybrid relief is all that the situation fairly admits.
Finally, the granting or denial of a preliminary injunction is in
large measure discretionary. Even where a prima facie violation
is made out, the court may be entirely justified in denying the
relief requested. 00
CONSENT

DECREE NEGOTIATIONS

A consent decree serves two functions: it gives defendant the
opportunity to negotiate the issue of relief, and if signed before the
taking of any "testimony," it forecloses potential claimants from
using the decree pursuant to Clayton section 5(a) as prima facie
evidence of a violation in any subsequent treble damage action.
It may be an advantage to negotiate over the details of relief at
any stage in the litigation. 101 At what point in the course of litigation does it become too late to sign a consent decree which will
qualify for evidentiary immunity with the aid of the proviso to
section 5(a)?102 Neither the legislative history nor the cases provide any very clear guide as to what constitutes "testimony."
Some consent decrees recite that the parties agree to its provisions,
"no testimony having been taken." Whether or not such recitation
appears, it is still open to argument in a subsequent treble damage action whether the decree should be admitted because "testimony" had, in fact, been taken. 10 3 The importance of the recita100. Cf. United States v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 270,
275-76 (W.D.N.Y. 1940) (preliminary injunction denied).
101. E.g., United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 1965 Trade Cas.

71,453 (D. Utah 1965)

(consent decree entered after trial and appeal

ordering a divestiture without delay).
102. Under common law rules of evidence a judgment against a

defendant in a government-instituted suit was inadmissible in a subsequent
treble damage action against the same defendant. Buckeye Powder Co. v.
DuPont Powder Co., 248 U.S. 55, 63 (1918).
103. The issue seems to have been litigated most often against the
background of a trial of the prior government case, a partial reversal on the

appeal and a remand for further proceedings. Where the consent decree
was entered before the second trial in the government case, defendants
have been unsuccessful in seeking to bar evidentiary use of the "consent

decree" in a subsequent private antitrust action. Webster Rosewood Corp.
v. Schine Chain Theatres, 157 F. Supp. 251, 255-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd on
other grounds, 263 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959);
Sablosky v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 137 F. Supp. 929, 935 (E.D. Pa.
1955); Don George, Inc. v. Paramount pictures, 111 F. Supp. 458, 466-67
(W.D. La. 1951); DeLuxe Theatre Corp. v. Balaban & Katz Corp., 95 F.
Supp. 983, 985-86 (N.D. Ill. 1951).

Query, would the result be the same if

the consent decree had been entered in the prior government case after a
remand for proceedings de novo?
In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 211 F. Supp.
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tion arises from the indication that some courts are not disposed to
look beyond it.'0 4 This is a factor to be kept in mind throughout
pre-trial examination. While the Justice Department may not
arbitrarily withhold its consent to the recitation, 105 as a practical
matter its willingness as trial date approaches to consent will have
some influence on the scope of substantive relief in the decree.
The recitation has not appeared in comparatively recent consent
decrees signed after litigating the propriety of preliminary relief
or after the Supreme Court
has heard an appeal from a decision
10 6
on summary judgment.
Under its current rules of procedure, the FTC may serve
notice of its intention to institute a proceeding, together with the
proposed complaint and a proposed form of order to cease and desist.10 7 The prospective respondent has ten days within which to
712 (N.D. Ill. 1962), plaintiffs contended that section 5(a) was inapplicable
because statements of counsel at the time of the pleas of nolo contendere
and guilty in government case constituted "testimony." Id. at 715 n.2.
Plaintiffs obviously were attempting to equate "testimony" and "evidence."
Id. at 718-19. "IT]he intent of the drafters of the [Clayton] Act applied to

testimony after the trial on the merits was initiated." Id. at 728. Compare
FEDERAL TREBLE DAMAGE ACTIONs 248-49 (1965)
("it is believed that the taking of any testimony is sufficient to make the proviso
inapplicable").
104. See Barnsdall Ref. Corp. v. Birnamwood Oil Co., 32 F. Supp. 308,
311-13 (E.D. Wis. 1940).
105. See United States v. William S. Gray & Co., 59 F. Supp. 665, 667
TIMBERLAKE,

(S.D.N.Y. 1945). Compare United States v. Brunswich-Balke-Collender
Co., 203 F. Supp. 657, 662 (E.D. Wis. 1962) ("The right given to antitrust
defendants by the proviso to § 5 to avoid the 'prima facie evidence' sanctioned by capitulation is an unqualified right"), with United States v. Ward
Baking Co., 376 U.S. 327, 334 (1964). ("Since we conclude that there was a
bona fide disagreement concerning substantive items of relief which could
be resolved only by trial, we need not, and do not, reach appellee's contention that where there is agreement on every substantive item of relief,
insistence by the Government upon an adjudication of guilt as a condition
to giving its consent to a judgment would conflict with the congressional
policy embodied in § 5 of the Clayton Act").
106. It may be argued that a stipulation to the effect that defendants
have denied the allegations, that the consent to entry of the decree constitutes no admission with respect to any issue, that the decree is entered
"without trial or adjudication on the merits of any issue of fact or law
herein", makes a recitation as to the absence of "testimony" academic.

Query, whether the following (containing such disclaimer but omitting any

recital as to testimony), are consent decrees within the proviso of § 5(a):

United States v. Parents Mag. Inc., 1962 Trade Cas. 70,437 (N.D. Ill. 1962)
(granting motion under Clayton section 7 for preliminary injunction), 1963
Trade Cas. 70,649 (N.D. Ill. 1963) (consent decree); White Motor Co. v.

United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963) (reversing partial appeal from granting
of summary judgment to the government and remanding for trial the legality of certain judicial restraints under Sherman section 1); United States
v. White Motor Co., 1964 Trade Cas. 71,195 (D. Ohio 1964) (consent decree
as to matters covered).
107. The consent order procedure will be made available when "time,
the nature of the proceedings and the public interest permit." 1963 FTC
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indicate whether it is prepared to negotiate towards entry of a
cease and desist order on consent. 108 This procedure contemplates
that if the prospective respondent does not signify within the
ten day period a willingness to negotiate, a complaint shall issue
and it will be too late to begin negotiations. There have been
recent exceptions. 0 9
DIvFsTIUnIi
The courts, in the context of Sherman Act cases, often displayed a marked reluctance toward divestiture." 0
The most
sweeping rationale offered for this judicial "self-restraint," is the
Court's much-quoted view in United States v. National Lead Co.,"
There "is no showing that four major competing units would be
preferable to two, or . . . that six would be better than four.
Likewise, there is no showing of the necessity for this divestiture
of plants or of its practicality or fairness. 111 2 This theory questions the basic role of the antitrust laws in dealing with structural distortions of the marketplace.
With regard to section 7, however, the enforcement agencies
clearly believe that divestiture should be the rule," 3 not the exRules of Practice § 2.1, 16 C.F.R. § 2.1 (1963). Contents of a cease and
desist order entered on consent may be found in this same rule of practice.
108. 1963 FTC Rules of Practice § 2.2, 16 C.F.R. § 2.2 (1963). Under
section 2.4(c), 16 C.F.R. § 2.4(c) (1963), should negotiations fail to produce
agreement upon a form of order, the Division of Consent Orders will refer
the matter for appropriate action to the FTC "together with any written
offers of settlement which the proposed respondents desire to have the
Commission consider."
109. 1963 FTC Rules of Practice § 2.4(d), 16 C.F.R. § 2.4(d) (1963)
provides:
After a complaint has been issued, the consent order procedure
described in this part of the rules will not be available. This, however, will not preclude a settlement of the case by regular adjudicatory processes through the filing of an admission answer or submission of the case to the hearing examiner on a stipulation of facts
and an agreed order.
Compare Lone Star Cement Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (1963-1965 Transfer
Binder)
17,183 (FTC 1965); The Grand Union Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP.
17,265 (FTC 1965) (consent order).
110. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO
STUDY TmE ANTITRUST LAWS 354 (1955).
111. 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
112. Id. at 352.
113. E.g., United States v. duPont & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 328, 331 (1961)
(cautioning that divestiture is not to be decreed automatically); Fruehauf
Trailer Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 17,260, at 22,363 (FTC 1965).
The district courts are given jurisdiction in section 7 cases instituted by
the Justice Department to order effective relief by section 15, 38 Stat. 736
(1914), as amended 62 Stat. 909 (1948), 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1964). The FTC
derives its authority to order relief in section 7 cases from section 11, 38
Stat. 734 as amended 73 Stat. 243 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1964). Before the
1950 amendments to section 7 eliminated the distinction between the Commission's jurisdiction over stock as compared to asset acquisitions, the nega-
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ception. It is the transaction which is illegal; therefore, to consider divestiture as the normal sanction is in line with decisions
on Sherman Act violations involving intercorporate combination
and control. In practice, however, divestiture is far from the exclusive remedy for section 7 violations. This is so either because
divestiture is found unnecessarily harsh or because it is impractical. What standards do the courts use in deciding upon the form
of relief?
In United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co.,11 4 the
Court restated Sherman Act principles of relief as applicable to
Clayton section 7 cases:
In considering the subject . . . three dominant influences must guide our action: 1. The duty of giving complete and efficacious effect to the prohibitions of the
statute; 2, the accomplishing of this result with as little
injury as possible to the interest of the general public;
and, 3, a proper regard for the vast interests of private
property which may have become vested in many persons
as a result of the acquisition either by way of stock owntive implication of this language of section 11 was a basis on which the
Supreme Court held that the Commission had no jurisdiction over asset
acquisitions under section 7. Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291
U.S. 587, 594-96 (1934). This gloss on section 11 was cited even after the
1950 amendment as a basis for arguing that divestiture is the exclusive
remedy in FTC section 7 proceedings. The Supreme Court declined to
commit itself on that point. United States v. duPont & Co., 366 U.S. 316,
328 n.9 (1961). Subsequently the Court has indicated that divestiture may
be implied from an agency's regulatory powers. See Pan American Airways
v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 312 (1963) ("It seems clear that such power
[to order divestiture] exists."); Gilbertville Trucking Co. v. United States,
371 U.S. 115, 129-31 (1962). Compare United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348 (1963) ("Congress in 1950 clearly intended to remove
all question concerning the FTC's remedial power over corporate acquisitions, and therefore explicitly enlarged the FTC's jurisdiction.") Recently
the FTC has expressed the view that it has power to order final relief in
almost as broad terms as a court in equity. Ekco Prod. Co., TRADE REG. REP.
(1963-1965 Transfer Binder)
16,879, at 21,897 (FTC 1964), aff'd, Ekco
Prod. Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965). The FTC feels it is now
empowered to require divestiture under section 5 (b) of Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719, as amended, 74 Stat. 200 (1964), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b)
(1964), as well as under Clayton section 11. E.g., Beatrice Foods Co., 3
TRADE REG. REP. T 17,244, at 22,335-38 (FTC 1965); Ekco Prod. Co., supra
at 21,904; American Cyanamid Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1963-1965 Transfer
Binder)
16,699, at 21,606 (FTC 1963) (dictum). See Baker, Dissolution,
Divestiture and Divorcement: Are they Remedies Under Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act?, 16 AD. L. BULL. 222 (1964); Duke, Scope
of Relief Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1192, 120708 (1963); Note, Implied Powers of Federal Agencies to Order Divestiture,
39 NOTRE DAME LAW. 581 (1964). Any right which private parties may have
to obtain divestiture would have to be implied from the language of Clayton
section 16, 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1964). See generally Note,
Availability of Divestiture in Private Litigation as a Remedy for Violation
of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 49 MINN. L. REV. 267 (1964).

114. 366 U.S. 316 (1961) (duPont II).
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ership or otherwise of interests in the stock or securities
of the combination without any guilty knowledge or intent in any way to become actors or participants in the
wrongs which we find to have inspired and dominated the
combination from the beginning. 115
Certain issues, such as the force of the hardship factor, are
frequently raised on questions of relief. In duPont II the Court
held that hardship-adverse tax consequences to duPont stockholders if a taxable distribution of General Motors stock was required-was a factor to be considered only in deciding between
equally effective methods of bringing about relief. The public
1 6
interest comes first.
In many cases the courts have been extraordinarily generous
in giving defendants years to arrange divestiture" 7 on the best
possible terms. Should defendant be required to divest at a substantial loss? According to one recent decision, the fact that
divestiture entails a loss to the seller is not ordinarily a matter of
much judicial concern."18 Several consent judgments, however,
have provided for conditional divestiture: the property is to be
placed upon the block for a specified period of time under specified conditions and at a knockdown price. Only if a buyer, satisfactory to the court and willing to satisfy the conditions stated,
appears within the prescribed waiting period, shall the property
have to be sold. 119
115. Id. at 327-28 quoting with approval United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 185 (1911).

116. United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. at
372-78.
117. E.g., id. at 335 (duPont given 10 years to divest itself of General
Motors stock). See S. Rep. No. 1100, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1469, 1471-72
(1962).
See also United States v. United Fruit Co., 1958 Trade Cas.
f 68,941 (8 years and 4 months). Not all judges are sympathetic to the
problems of "unscrambling the omelette." First Nat'l Bank v. United
States, BNA, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 189, at A-1 (February 23,
1965) and No. 193, at A-10 (March 23, 1965), a district court dissatisfied
with the progress of negotiations on a plan of divestiture between the Government and a bank under order to "unmerge," recently held defendants in
contempt and fined them $100 a day. To its credit, the Justice Department
has opposed the contempt order. Happily the Supreme Court agrees, reversing the judgment holding the bank in contempt, and pointing out that
no order of divestiture had been entered by the lower court until a month
after the finding of contempt. First Security Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co. v.
United States, 1965 Trade Cas. 71,572 (Supreme Court 1965) (per curiam).
118. United States v. Continental Can Co., 1964 Trade Cas. %71,264, at
80,139 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). If defendant had paid an extravagant price for the
property to be divested, either out of poor business judgment or, indeed,
with the predatory intention of buying out a competitor, clearly to make
divestiture contingent upon the availability of another buyer willing to pay
an equally extravagent price, would make the court's order little more than
a formality.
119. E.g., United States v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 1965
Trade Cas. 71,354 (D.R.I. 1965); United States v. Lucky Lager Brewing

Co., 1958 Trade Cas.

69,160 (D. Utah 1958).
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Recently, the Justice Department has displayed sensitivity to
proof of serious hardship to employees. After initially refusing a
clearance for a recent acquisition, it reversed itself and granted the
clearance after two plants in economically depressed areas were
closed down and employees were thrown out of work. 120 Under a
consent decree in another case, a plant must be sold only if the
buyer undertakes to fulfill the outstanding pension plans, which
could be an onerous burden 12if a large percentage of the employees
are approaching retirement. '
In United States v. Continental Can Co., 2 2 the court declined
to require two plants in depressed areas even to be offered for
sale subject to conditions, for fear that the very threat of sale
might divert customers and otherwise cause dislocations to the
labor force. It did require Continental to make express representations "that it will continue to maintain these ventures as
efficient competitive enterprises and take such steps as may be
necessary for their continued efficient operation and modernization
and expansion. ' '123 Where the courts do not require sale at a loss,
however,
they may enjoin, or at least, limit, the use of the prop24
erty.
Some decrees provide explicitly that prospective purchasers
must be approved by the court or the FTC. 25 It may be a problem to find any purchaser. Various factors may severely limit
the number of prospective buyers for property to be divested.
If it is considered essential to restore the pre-existing number of
competitors, the size of the transaction may eliminate many bidders. If the industry is static, it will not be very inviting to
venture capital. If the businesses have been intermingled, there
will be no recent earnings record indicating how the property to
be divested would have fared on its own bottom. Adequate management may be uncertain. For these and other good reasons,
some decrees contemplate spinning the property off to the public
shareholders of the acquiring company, limiting the interest that
management or the stockholders may have in the stock of the new
126
company.
120. See BNA, ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 197, at A-2 (April
20, 1965).

Cas.

121. United States v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 1965 Trade
71,354 (D.R.I. 1965).
122. 1964 Trade Cas. 71,264 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
123. Id* at 80,143.
124. E.g., United States V. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 121 F. Supp. 141

(E.D.N.Y. 1954).

125. E.g., FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965),
affirming TRADE REG. REP. (1961-1963 Transfer Binder)
16,362 (FTC 1963),
reversing 329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1964); United States v. El Paso Natural
Gas Co., 1965 Trade Cas. 71,453 (D. Utah 1965).
126. E.g., ibid. See also Crown Zellerbach Corp., 54 F.T.C. 769, 808
(1957), affd, Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 370 U.S. 937 (1962).
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In order to encourage buyers with little experience in an industry, decrees have required the seller to stand ready to provide
a wide range of assistance on request. Some mandatory injunctions require the seller to supply the new company with sales
information, 127 engineering and technical assistance 128 and needed
raw materials at its prevailing rates. 12 9 In an effort to guard the
new business from loss of key employees, the divesting company
has been forbidden to hire0 any employee of the new company
13
without its prior approval.
AFTER-ACQUIRED IMPROVEMENTS

It is particularly difficult to find consistency in decisions regarding the necessity to dispose of after-acquired property. Capital assets traceable to the reinvestment of the cash flow arising
from depreciation of acquired property or proceeds from the sale
of acquired assets, seem fairly within the scope of a divestiture
order.'8 ' Some courts and the FTC have gone further and included major after-acquired additions,' 32 even new plants. 3 3 In
United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington,3 4 a
section 7 case brought under Sherman Act sections 1 and 2,115 the
trial court on remand ordered the merged banks to create an
independent commercial bank which would be the equivalent to
the bank acquired at the time of the consolidation with a proportionate share of any increments and improvements since that time.
In terms of assets, deposits and number of employees, how is a
proportionate share to be determined?
In Pillsbury Mills, Inc.,136 the FTC issued a very vaguely
127.

Hooker Chem. Corp.,

TRADE

REG. REP. (1963-1965 Transfer Binder)

1 15,369 (FTC 1961) (consent order).
128.

E.g., Ekco Prod. Co.,

TRADE REG. REP.

(1961-1963 Transfer Binder)

1 16,956 (FTC 1964), aff'd, Ekco Prod. Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir.
1965); United States v. Ryder Sys., Inc., 1961 Trade Cas. f 70,056 (S.D. Fla.
1961).

See also Hooker Chem. Corp.,

TRADE REG.

REP. (1961-1963 Transfer

Binder) 1 15,369 (FTC 1961).
129. Lone Star Cement Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (1963-1965 Transfer
Binder) 1 17,183 (FTC 1965).
130. E.g., United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 1965 Trade Cas.
1171,453 (D. Utah 1965) (five year restriction); United States v. Ingersoll
Rand Co., 1964 Trade Cas. 1 71,074 (W.D. Pa. 1964) (ten year restriction).
131. Maryland & Virginia Milk Prod. Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S.
458, 472-73 (1960).
132. E.g., Crown Zellerbach Corp., 54 F.T.C. 769, 806-08 (1957), aff'd,
Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 937 (1962). Compare Union Carbide Corp., 59 F.T.C. 614, 657
(1961); Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 57 F.T.C. 1274, 1412-15 (1960).
133. E.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 233 F. Supp. 718
(E.D. Mo. 1964) (finding illegality). Contra, Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC,
309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
134. 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
135. Id. at 673 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
136. 57 F.T.C. 1274 (1960).
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worded decree that after-acquired improvements must be divested
so as to restore a substantial, going concern and an effective
competitor. In Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC,'37 the FTC was faced
with a more difficult problem. Arrow, the acquired company,
had leased its plant. After the acquisition, Reynolds built with
its own money a $500,000 plant and transferred to it the Arrow
operations. The FTC's divestiture order included the new plant
and any other assets and properties put into the business since
the acquisition so as to restore it to its former standing. 3 8 On
appeal, Reynolds resisted, arguing that the FTC had no power to
order divestiture of assets not obtained by the acquisition. The
Court agreed, though not on the broad "due process" argument
advanced by Reynolds. The focus of the FTC's case was the anticompetitive effect of the acquisition on the market existing in
1956. In that context, "after-acquired properties are not relevant,
except . ..where they represent reinvestment of capital realized
from the sale of property included in the forbidden acquisition
and replacement of that property."'1 9 Relief, therefore, should be
limited to the assets acquired, severable here from the afteracquired property. Leaving the question whether after-acquired
property could "ever" be subject to divestiture, the Court held that
it would require a far greater showing of necessity. It would have
to be shown that (a) the violation was somehow based on continued possession of the after-acquired property, and (b) inclusion of after-acquired property
was essential to the restoration
40
of the competitive status quo.1
The FTC has refused to accede to the Reynolds view of the
4
limits of its power. In Ekco Products Co. v. FTC,'1
the FTC reasserted its right to order divestiture of after-acquired properties
when restoration of competition so demands. Several possible
countervailing factors were suggested:
But consideration of a multitude of equitable factors
is inescapable-the respondent's good faith, the proportion of after-acquired to acquired assets, the extent to
which they can be segregated, whether the after-acquired
properties represent reinvestment of proceeds from the acquired properties or the normal growth that would have
taken place if the merger had not occurred ...142
Ecko presented particularly difficult problems. The plant of the
acquired company had been sold and its operations transferred
to a plant of the acquiring corporation. Should an acquiring
company be required to buy or build a plant and reestablish an
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
Transfer
142.

309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
56 F.T.C. 1680 (1960).
309 F.2d at .231.
Ibid.
347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965), affirming TRADE REG.
Binder) 16,879 (FTC 1964).
TRADE REG. REiP. (1963-1965 Transfer Binder)

REP.

(1963-1965

16,879, at 21,908.
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entity which can then be sold as a viable competitor? The FTC
143
required assets peculiar to the product line to be divested.
Since the acquired company had had a near monopoly of its
product, however, this amounts to ordering the sale of equipment
without any logical "home."
The FTC's approach to divestiture of after-acquired property
has been criticized as "gingerly."' 4 4 It can, of course, be argued
that an acquiring company takes its chances in improving acquired property. Suppose, however, that defendant declines the
risk of being required to divest improvements and additions, and
defers large expenditures until the legality of the transaction is
resolved. If the transaction is ultimately held illegal, the new
entity may require heavy capital expenditures to become an effective competitor. Where is the capital to come from.?
[A]ny divestiture order subsequently issued may and
should require divestiture of sufficient cash to insure adequate working capital for the divested company plus such
cash or assets as may be required to finance any needed
capital improvements, or other modernization of the plants
to be divested. In short, our position is that the company
required to divest itself of illegally acquired assets should
do whatever is necessary, including expenditure of funds,
to restore those assets to
the competitive vigor they had
45
prior to the acquisition..
ACQUISITIONS

Blocks of Stock
Here marketability will rarely be a problem and duPont II
to
indicates that divestiture is usual. 46 There are exceptions
47
divestiture but the exceptions may be worse than the rule.
Horizontal Acquisitions
Divestiture will probably be the rule when there is a horizontal acquisition. The rule, however, has many. interesting possible
applications. Brown Shoe implied that relief might be limited to
that part of the transaction found to offend. 48 If the markets of
the two companies overlap in only a limited geographical area of
16,957, at 22,020.
143. TRADE REG. REP. (1963-1965 Transfer Binder)
144. See Zimmerman, The Federal Trade Commission and Mergers,
64 COLUM. L. REV. 500, 521 (1964).
145. Orrick, The Antitrust Division's Enforcement Program, (1965 New
York State Bar Ass'n Antitrust Symposium) 31, 37-38 (1965).
146. United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316,
328-31 (1961). The Court, however, indicated that divestiture was not an
automatic remedy. Id. at 328 n. 9.
147. See American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co.,
152 F. Supp. 387, 400-01 & n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir.

1958).
148.

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,. 337 .& n.65 (1962).
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particular product line, the relief may be limited to that area 149
or that product line. In many cases it may be possible to sell
one plant, one patent, one trademark, one process. Indeed, defendants have not always been required to divest the precise property acquired. They have sometimes been able to keep most, if
not all, of the property acquired on condition that they gave something up they already had. When Hilton acquired the Statler
group, the biggest hotel chain in the United States with fifteen
first-class hotels in this country alone took over the second largest
chain, with nine big hotels. The case was settled by consent, the
decree limiting the number of big hotels in each major convention
city which Hilton might operate at one time. Hilton had to dispose
of three of four specified hotels all of which it already owned, but
it was permitted to keep the Statler hotels acquired. In addition,
the court enjoined Hilton from acquiring any hotel before January 1, 1961, if the acquisition would result in control of more
than one of a group of listed hotels in Washington, St. Louis or
Los Angeles-Beverly Hills, or more than four hotels in New York
City. Thus, defendant was given a continuing choice. 150
Against this flexible approach, should be contrasted Kennecott
Copper Corp. v. United States,' 5' where the Government argued
that assets already owned should be divested along with those acquired. The trial court held illegal the 1958 acquisition by the
largest copper producer, a subsidiary of which had 2.1 per cent of
a cable submarket, of Okonite, the third largest copper fabricator,
with 19.6 per cent of sales in that cable submarket. Kennecott
appealed the holding of illegality and the breadth of the order.
If the acquisition was illegal, why should the Government have
urged that it be required to divest not only the assets acquired
from Okonite but also its own related fabricating operations?
Kennecott characterized this as the first case where the Government tried to have a horizontal combination of two fabricators
held unlawful because of an adverse effect on competition, while
seeking to enjoin them from separating. Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court summarily affirmed.
In other cases, partial divestiture is hardly feasible. The acquired company's principal asset may be its trade name or good
will. Here divestiture may be directed toward restoring, insofar
as possible, the exact identity of the acquired company. In A.G.
Spalding & Bros., Inc. v. FTC,152 respondent was ordered to divest
itself of stock, assets, patents, trade-marks, trade names, contracts,
149.

Cf. Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 279, 283 (3d Cir.

1961).

150. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 1956 Trade Cas.
(N.D. Ill. 1956).

68,253

151. 381 U.S. 414 (1965), affirming per curiam, 231 F. Supp. 95
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).
152. 301 F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1962), affirming, 56 F.T.C. 1125 (1960).
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business and good will and all other properties, rights and privileges acquired from Rawlings, a competing baseball manufacturer,
so as to restore Rawlings to substantially the same relative competitive standing it formerly had in the athletic goods industry at
or around the time of the acquisition. A pipeline is another kind
of asset which can hardly be divested piecemeal, but, in United
States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 153 defendant was allowed a certain flexibility in restoring the capital structure of the new pipeline company which must now be created. New Company is to
assume a proportionate part of El Paso debt and issue its own
obligations to satisfy the El Paso obligation. Within three years
after the transfer of assets to New Company, El Paso must either
distribute at least 80 per cent of New Company stock to such
holders of El Paso common stock as agree to tender all their
El Paso common for New Company stock and sell the balance of
New Company stock to the public or make a public offering of all
the New Company stock.
Horizontal integration of the manufacturing operations of the
two companies presents particularly difficult problems on relief.
Such a situation is presented in the pending Diamond Alkali
Company proceeding. 154 There, shortly after a complaint had
issued, Diamond removed the equipment from one acquired plant
and, subsequently, approved the closing of the last of the plants
acquired and a corresponding expansion of one of its own plants.
The FTC staff argued that Diamond must:
...not be allowed to avoid the remedy of divestiture by
the determination to abandon its older less efficient plant
with full knowledge of the possible outcome of already
instituted litigation. If respondent's sale of its own assets
subsequent to a merger constitutes a bar to an order of
divestiture, this will encourage operators of older plants to
swap them for more modern facilities through merger. 155
Even complete divestiture, removing Diamond from the field,
would not restore a second competitor to the market. The staff
went so far as to suggest that Diamond be required to build a
new plant and then dispose of that to restore competition: "Diamond Alkali clearly has the capital to construct a new plant within
or adjacent to its existing market and continue as an effective
competitor in the manufacture and sale of portland cement."' 156
Another solution suggested for this problem would be to delay
divestiture for several years and hope that Diamond would take
153.

1965 Trade Cas.

154.

TRADE

71,453 (D.Utah 1965).

16,908 (Hearing
Examiner 1964) (divestiture order), motion for postponement of oral argument of appeal to FTC denied, TRADE REG. REP. (1963-1965 Transfer Binder)
17,185 (FTC 1965).
155. Brief for FTC, p. 51, Diamond Alkali Co., TRADE REG. REP. (19631965 Transfer Binder) 16,908 (Hearing Examiner 1964).
156. Ibid.
REG. REP. (1963-1965 Transfer Binder)
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the opportunity
to reenter the field voluntarily by building an157
other plant.
Vertical Acquisitions
Here divestiture may be accompanied by a mandatory injunction or, depending upon the extent of foreclosure already
accomplished, a prohibitory injunction, entirely prospective in
operation, may suffice.
An example of coupling wholesale divestiture with a mandatory injunction to provide essential raw materials to the plants
divested, is the cease and desist order recently entered by consent
in Lone Star Cement Corp.158 Portland cement is an essential
ingredient of ready-mixed concrete. The FTC attacked the acquisitions by one of the three largest producers of portland cement of two ready-mixed concrete companies with a number of
plants, alleging that an integrated company had a marked advantage over unintegrated concrete producers. 15 9 Perhaps because in
many areas concrete producers account for more than half of the
available cement, it was necessary to assure a continuation of suppliers to induce purchasers for, and effective operation of, the
plants. Lone Star has agreed to ap order requiring it to divest
25 of the 31 plants acquired in different areas with present equipment and necessary trucks; prohibiting future concrete acquisitions for a period; and requiring Lone Star for three years after
divestiture of each plant to affirmatively offer mineral aggregates
for the use of the purchasers in the manufacture of ready-mixed
concrete equivalent to the quantity consumed by each plant in
1963.10 The order also limits the amount of business which Lone
Star Cement may do during the next three years: it shall not
supply to purchasers of the divested plants for consumption in
the plants in the manufacture of ready-mixed concrete more than
35 per cent of the portland cement consumed, in the aggregate, by
all of the divested plants in each such area. Sales of portland
cement to any of the divested plants as a result of the specification by a customer of the plant requiring the purchase of Lone
Star's cement, however, shall not be taken into consideration in
computing the amount of cement supplied or consumed in accordance with this provision.
In United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp.,16 the Justice Department attacked the acquisitions by the leading community television antennae manufacturer and servicer of ten
community television systems. Laying stress on the rapid growth
157. BNA, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 193, at A-4, A-5 (March
23, 1965).
158. TRADE REG. REP. (1963-1965 Transfer Binder) 17,183 (FTC 1965).
159. Id. at 22,257.
160. Id. at 22,258.
161.

187 F. Supp. 545, 563 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
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of the industry and finding that foreclosure amounted to something between 1.5 per cent and 10 per cent of the market, the
court was unable to conclude that defendant had yet gone so far
in successive minute acquisitions to justify a finding of violation
sufficient to justify divestiture. 16 2 Jerrold had indicated an intention to continue to acquire additional systems, and the court felt
its acquisitions were "approaching, if not beyond, the point where
it can be said with reasonable probability that they will have the
prohibited effects in the context of Jerrold's prominent position
in the industry."' 6 3 Therefore the court enjoined future acquisitions. But, "because of the quality of the Government's evidence"
and the industry's dynamic history, the restriction ran only for a
period of three years from the date the suit was brought-so that
it had only some two years to go. Moreover, Jerrold was allowed to apply to the court within the limited period "to permit
16 4
any additional acquisitions which they feel they can justify.' 1
Though the
relief is curious in many ways, the Supreme Court
16 5
affirmed.
Restraints on Internal Growth
Where divestiture is evidently impracticable, the enforcement
agencies have bargained for limitations on future internal expansion-a theory of relief which hardly "tracks" the offense of
section 7, although it could follow readily enough under a Sherman
Act section 2 theory. Thus, in the settlement finally worked out
in Scott Paper Co. v. FTC,6 6 brought solely under section 7 in
return for being allowed to keep virtually all the properties
previously ordered divested, respondent agreed to discontinue the
production of specified product lines with machinery acquired in
the illegal transactions.
Comparable restrictions have been decreed as an aid to divestiture, evidently designed to insulate the successor firms from
too much competition from their predecessors during a transitional period. 16 7 For the next three years, except for temporary
batch plants established to supply concrete to a single project,
Lone Star may not sell or distribute ready-mixed concrete in
specified areas except from presently existing locations not subject
to divestiture. 68 Prohibiting otherwise lawful acts has been up162. Id. at 566-67.
163. Ibid.
164. Id. at 567.
165. 365 U.S. 567 (1961)

166.

(per curiam).

Unreported settlement approved by the Third Circuit Court on
April 23, 1964. See Note, Preserving the Possibilities of DeconcentrationThe Scott Paper Case, 50 VA. L. REV. 907 (1964).
167. Lone Star Cement Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (1961-1963 Transfer
Binder)

17,183 (FTC 1965).

168.. Id. at 22,258.
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held as appropriate relief in some Sherman Act cases, in order
"to dissipate unlawful advantages."' 16 9 To extend this rule to
restraints on internal growth is a radical departure from the ideal
of a brawl among competitors, each trying to sell all he can most
profitably make.
Conglomerate Acquisitions
Much turns on the kind of inferences which the FTC and the
courts are prepared to draw as to future competitive pressures.
In Procter & Gamble Co., 170 the FTC was concerned that Procter &
Gamble's "deep pocket" would permit it to extend the benefits of
maximum advertising discounts to the acquired company. Divestiture was decreed, although this hardly alters the imperfections
in the marketplace which so concerned the FTC. FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp. 171 posed the problem whether a merger
which permits the acquiring company to use its buying power to
coerce its suppliers to purchase from its newly acquired subsidiary demands divestiture. In 1951, Consolidated, a large food
distributor at both the wholesale and retail levels which marketed
some products under its own private label, acquired Gentry, processing dehydrated onions and garlic. In the interval between the
acquisition and the FTC's complaint in 1958, dehydrated onion and
garlic industry sales doubled. Ninety per cent of industry sales
were still accounted for by Gentry and Basic but Basic's share of
onion sales dropped from 60 per cent to 57 per cent while Gentry's
rose from 28 per cent to 35 per cent. By contrast, Basic's share of
garlic sales rose from 36 per cent to 50 per cent. Gentry's dropped
from 51 per cent to 39 per cent. Seven instances where Consolidated overtly practiced "reciprocal buying" policies, inducing Consolidated suppliers to buy from Gentry, persuaded the Examiner
that the acquisition was illegal. 72 The FTC's theory was broader:
it came close to announcing that the acquisition was illegal because
it provided the opportunity to induce reciprocal buying practices. 173 Its order, 74 recently affirmed by the Supreme Court, requires divestiture. Would an injunction against the practice of
reciprocity have sufficed? Is a merger to be condemned because
169. See United States v. Bausch & Lomb Co., 321 U.S. 707, 729 (1944);
FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 430 (1957); United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 89-90 (1950); United States v. Crescent
Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 188 (1944); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United
States, 309 U.S. 436, 461 (1940); Local 167, I.B.T. v. United States, 291

U.S. 293 (1934).
170. TRADE REG. REP. (1963-1965 Transfer Binder)
171.

172. TRADE REG. REP. (1961-1963 Transfer Binder)
(Hearing Examiner 1962).

173.

16,673 (FTC 1963).

380 U.S. 592 (1965), reversing 529 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1964).
TRADE REG. REP. (1961-1963 Transfer Binder)

(FTC 1962).
174. TRADE REG. REP. (1961-1963 Transfer Binder)

15,662, at 20,497

16,182, at 20,978

16,362 (FTC 1963).
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it extends the area within which predatory tactics may be practiced? Why not assume equally that a merger will lead to pricefixing? Even if it does, why not in the first instance simply enjoin the predatory tactics? 17 5
Future Acquisitions
In its complaint against Jersey Standard's proposed purchase
for some 250 million dollars of the West Coast assets of Tidewater,
the Justice Department demanded a permanent injunction against
all future acquisitions by Jersey Standard in the oil industry. 176
The transaction was abandoned and, in this instance, the complaint dropped. Does abandonment of a proposed merger or voluntary divestiture of the most recent acquisition under attack
make the issue of further relief moot? A recent Assistant Attorney-General explained:
The Division in various cases has attempted to obtain
an injunction against further acquisitions in the field in
which the company to be acquired did business, even
though the acquiring company had either abandoned its
merger proposal or had, after our suit, disposed of its
shares. We feel that these various attempts are fully consonant with the broad equity discretion
available to a
court in remedying Section 7 violations. 177
The power to enjoin future acquisitions is also being asserted
by the FTC. 178 Although several cease and desist orders require
that for some specified period the prior approval of the FTC be
secured before a future acquisition is consummated, 1 79 it is not
175. Compare Consolidated Foods Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (1961-1963
Transfer Binder) 16,182 at 20,979 (FTC 1962) ("Section 7 is the appropiate statute for dealing with the problem of eliminating anti-competitive
effects directly attributable to a merger in their incipiency"), with Ekco
Prod. Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1963-1965 Transfer Binder)
16,879, at 21,902
(FTC 1964)

("It is illogical and impractical to use Section 7 as a vehicle

for attacking anticompetitive practices rooted in causes other than particular merger being challenged").
176. Prayer for Relief, United States v. Standard Oil Co., Civil No.
64-490 HW, S.D. Cal., April 14, 1964. When the acquisition was abandoned
the complaint was dropped.
When Jersey subsequently proposed to acquire a potash company, the
Justice Department filed another § 7 complaint, but here the prayer for
relief did not specifically demand an injunction against any future acquisition of a fertilizer company. See Prayer for Relief, United States v.
Standard Oil Co., Civ. No. 954-64, D.N.J., Oct. 22, 1964.

177.
178.

Orrick, supranote 145, at 37.

The FTC has compared its power to ban future acquisitions in a

section 7 case to the powers of a court. Ekco Prod Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745
(7th Cir. 1965), affirming TRADE REG. REP. (1963-1965 Transfer Binder)
16,879 (FTC 1964).
179. See, e.g., Continental Baking Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1961-1963
Transfer Binder)
16,306 (FTC 1963) (consent order); Luria Bros & Co.,
TRADE REG. REP. (1961-1963 Transfer Binder)
16,299 (FTC 1963) (order
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clear by what standard or in which forum an FTC decision to
withhold approval should be tested. As to the standard, the FTC
cannot arbitrarily withhold approval.18 0 Is the burden, however,
on the FTC or on the respondent? As to the forum, does respondent first bring an action under the Administrative Procedure
Act i s1 or seek some special remedy against the FTC such as declaratory judgment 182 or appeal to the Court of Appeals s 3 or
proceed with the transaction and appeal the penalty proceed84
ing?
A very interesting attempt to spell out in advance the conditions under which a future acquisition will be approved is the
recent cease and desist order, entered on consent, in Automatic
litigated under Clayton § 7 and Federal Trade Commission Act § 5); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1961-1963 Transfer Binder)
15,360 (FTC 1961) (consent order). Compare Foremost Dairies, Inc.,
TRADE REG. REP. (1961-1963 Transfer Binder)
15,877 (FTC 1962).
180. Beatrice Foods Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 17,244 at 22,338 n.48 (FTC
1965).
181. Section 10 of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat.
243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964), reads in part:
Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2)
agency action is by law committed to agency discretion (a) Right of review - Any person suffering legal wrong because
of any agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such
action within the meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled
to judicial review thereof.
182. Although section 11 (d) of the Clayton Act may be read to confer
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over FTC section 7 proceedings in the court
of appeals, there have been instances where respondents have successfully

obtained judicial review of FTC action under the Clayton Act by bringing a
nonstatutory proceeding in a federal district court, as for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. E.g., Graber Mfg. Co. v. Dixon, 223 F. Supp.
1020 (D.D.C. 1963). See generally 3 DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TREATISE
§ 23.04 (1958).
183. Section 11 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 734 (1914), as amended
15 U.S.C. § 21 (c) (1964) provides in part:
(c) Any person required by such order of the commission...
to cease and desist from any such violation may obtain a review of
such order in the court of appeals of the United States for any circuit within which such violation occurred or within which such person resides or carries on business, by filing in the court, within
sixty days after the date of the service of such order, a written
petition praying that the order of the commission or board be set
aside ....
Upon such filing of the petition the court shall have
jurisdiction of the proceeding and of the question determined therein concurrently with the commission or board until the filing of the
record, and shall have power to make and enter a decree affirming,
modifying, or setting aside the order of the commission or board,
and enforcing the same to the extent that such order is affirmed,
and to issue such writs as are ancillary to its jurisdiction or are necessary in its judgment to prevent injury to the public or to competitors pendente lite.
184. See 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 45(d) (1964).
Cf. Joseph A. Kaplan & Sons, Inc. v. FTC, 1965 Trade Cas.
71,444, at
80,945-46 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Here the court held that respondent's right
under the Rules of Practice to seek the FTC's advice as to whether proposed
conduct violates a cease and desist order does not justify an unduly broad
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Retailers of America, Inc.185 The FTC had alleged that Automatic
Retailers of America, organized in 1959, was by 1962 the second
largest multiple line vendor in the country and that sixteen of
its acquisitions violated section 7. ARA agreed to dispose of two
acquisitions and accepted a formula limitation on future acquisitions. The basis for the formula is the close correlation in practice between population figures and vending sales. In thirteen
specified Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas acquisitions of
companies operating vending routes are prohibited, in others they
are permitted under a graduated schedule (keyed to population and
sales volume) that places a maximum on the dollar amount of
sales which may be controlled during the three-year period for
which the decree is effective. 86
INDUSTRYWIDE ENFORCEMENT

Several pressures are currently working towards an enforcement policy on an industrywide basis. First, as noted, whole industries may be caught up in a merger race. Second, the doctrine
that heavy concentration in an industry may be a basis for striking down an otherwise lawful merger appears to compel some
industrywide approach.
Evidently discouraged by the continued prospect of trying to
pursue acquisitions, if not one-by-one, then at least offending company by offending company, the FTC has announced that it is
contemplating a formula for future vertical mergers in the cement industry. 8 7 This formula is being approached by way of a
rule-making procedure. Questionnaires have been sent to industry
members.18 8
According to Commissioner Elman, the kind of
order issued under subsection c of the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526
(1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1964).
185. TRADE REG. REP. (1963-1965 Transfer Binder)
17,018, at 22,124
(FTC 1964).
186. Id. at 22,124. See also The Grand Union Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP.
17,265 (FTC 1965) (consent order).
187. Permanents Cement Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1963-1965
Binder) 1 16,885 (FTC 1964).

Transfer

188. The investigation was instituted by way of a FTC resolution,
issued December 1, 1964, and reading in part:
WHEREAS there have occurred during recent years and are
continuing to occur numerous acquisitions of corporations engaged
in the manufacture of ready-mixed concrete and concrete products
by corporations engaged in the production and distribution of Portland cement; and
WHEREAS, for purposes of law-enforcement, the Commission
has determined that it would be in the public interest to conduct an
investigation in order to obtain information--concerning such matters as the structure of the cement-producing and principal cementconsuming industries, the nature of the relevant product and geographical markets, the causes and business reasons underlying such
acquisitions, and the probable effects of such acquisitions on competitive conditions of the market and industries involved-which
may be of assistance to the Commission in discharging its respon-
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"rule" envisaged is a guideline, not an invariable guide. The need
for such an apprach is explained on several counts: (1) the
need to apply general standards to concrete business contexts;
(2) litigation is said to be an unsatisfactory method of conducting
the necessary fact-finding; and (3) the businessman's need for
guidance.8 9 If the rule is not to simply restate section 7, it must
produce a formula which will indicate the permissible limits of
integration and concentration in a geographical area. This, of
course, anticipates a mechanical approach.
Whether any very sophisticated formula could be devised for
most industries is doubtful. That any rule is likely to announce
rather primitive conclusions is suggested by the extended dicta
in Beatrice Foods Co.,19 0 where Commissioner Elman, noting the
FTC's experience with mergers and pricing problems in the dairy
industry, undertook to lay down some guidelines for future acquisitions in the dairy industry. Recognizing that small one-plant
firms are not likely to survive the next decades and that the big
dairies should be subjected to more competition, Elman suggests
that an acquisition by a dairy "giant," i.e., a company with sales of
$200 million, of any "not insubstantial" dairy will be "highly suspect." An acquisition by a dairy with sales of 40-60 million dollars, of other medium-sized dairies will be at least "questionable,"
but an acquisition of a dairy with less than 10 million dollars in
sales which is not a direct or potential competitor may pass.
An acquisition by a "reasonably small" dairy or a dairy too small
to achieve economies of scale is clearly legal and would strengthen
competition.' 9' These industry-wide guidelines, however modest,
may be regarded as the closest the enforcement agencies have come
to approaching the key problem of defining the extent to which
mergers should be allowed to occur in an oliopolistic market. 92
sibilities to enforce the laws, in particular Section 7 of the Clayton
Act (15 U.S.C. 18), applicable to such acquisitions.
The questionnaires are in the form of special reports directed to industry members, as authorized by § 6 (b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
38 Stat. 721 (1914) 15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1964).
189. Elman, Rulemaking Procedure'sin the FTC's Enforcement of the
Merger Law, 78 HARV. L. REV. 385 (1964).
190. 3 TRADE REG. REP. 17,244 (FTC 1965).

191.

Id. at 22,336-37.

The effect of these guidelines on formulating a

decree may prove illuminating. Deferring entry of a final order, the Commission gave staff counsel and respondent an opportunity to submit recom-

mendations.

192. The Justice Department is also currently at work on merger
guidelines. Early indications suggest that the department's approach is not
so much to try to improve upon existing confusion as to use the fact of

confusion as the justification for still harsher formulae. For an acrid whiff

of such an approach, see the remarks of Assistant Attorney-General Turner
in Proposed Merger Guidelines, Annual Meeting, Antitrust Committee, Fed.
Bar Ass'n, Transcript of Panel Discussion, Current Antitrust Implications in
the Merger Field 4 (September 11, 1965). There the following hypothetical

example of a guideline is sympathetically given:
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Finally, some sort of an industrywide approach may be virtually dictated by the problems of relief. If section 7 is properly
applied to halt a trend toward concentration, 193 the more aggresLet us suppose we have an industry composed of ten firms of
approximately equal size operating in what we shall assume to be a
properly defined market. In this kind of a situation what, if anything, would be wrong with applying a rule that simply prohibited
any mergers among these firms, assuming that they were viable
• . . and thus refusing to allow any mergers of [sic] this
industry?
The agency displaying the most imaginative techniques to corporate
mergers and acquisitions in wholesale lots-situations of almost unparalleled complexity-is the Interstate Commerce Commission, currently
addressing the problem of approving the voluntary realignment of many
of the nation's strongest railroads. While wishing to enable the stronger
roads to solve their long standing troubles, the ICC is faced with the
need to hold the door open to the weaker railroads which no railroad
particularly wants. One approach employed by the ICC has been to condition approval upon the willingness of the larger companies to entertain
negotiations with the weaker roads over a protracted period of time-as
long as 10 years. Pennsylvania Railroad Company-Merger-New York
Central Railroad Company (ICC Finance Dkt. 21,989) (Lyle and Darmstadter, Hearing Examiners) Appendix U: "Certain Conditions to Approval,"
Par. 10.
Leaving "the record open" for 10 years seems an imaginative way of
permitting economies to be first created and then shared with weaker competitive factors. It is not easy to see how this device could be transposed
readily to the context of mergers of industrial corporations, except perhaps
where joint ventures involving raw materials in short supply, key outlets, or
economies of scale beginning at some very high threshold were involved.
But note that one court has recently held that, in approving the AtlanticSeaboard merger, the ICC did not give sufficient weight to antitrust considerations. Florida E. Coast Ry. v. United States, 242 F. Supp. 14 (M.D.
Fla. 1965), appeal filed September 10, 1965.
193. Should it matter whether an industrywide trend toward concentration is due to widespread mergers or other more internal economic
forces? Compare United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 223 F. Supp. 475,
492 (E.D. Wis. 1964):
Our interpretation of the authorities cited by the plaintiff, the
Bethlehem Steel case, the Brown Shoe case, and the Philadelphia
Bank case, is not that Congress, in enacting § 7, was attempting to
stifle or immobilize successful competitors or to secure for those
who did not wish to compete or for failing competitors-those who
could not compete because of inferior products, management, etc.a place in the market. Rather, it wished to prevent overzealous
competitors from enhancing their positions to the detriment of competition by mergers or acquisitions. The type of concentration section 7 was designed to avoid was concentration resulting from
mergers and acquisitions, not increases in market shares resulting
from superiority of product or services.
and Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78
Harv. L. Rev. 1313, 1326 (1965):
It is undeniable that the legislative history of the 1950 amendment to section 7 indicated extensive, if not primary, preoccupation with the alleged evils of concentration and the alleged virtues
of small entrepreneurship. But in regard to the issue whether
economics should be a ground for invalidating mergers, I find no
credible support for the statement in Brown Shoe that Congress
consciously appreciated the possible efficiency cost of attempting to

36
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sive firms might all be cut back to some modest stature. If this
is done in a series of contemporaneous cases against individual
preserve fragmented industries and consciously resolved the competing considerations in favor of decentralization.
Beyond this, there seem to be overpowering reasons against
using cost savings as a basis for invalidating conglomerate or other
mergers.
with Jurisdictional Statement for Appellant, pp. 15-16, United States v.

Pabst Brewing Co., 223 F. Supp. 475 (E.D. Wis. 1964):

The court below gave no weight whatever to the evidence of a
trend toward concentration, holding, in effect, that such evidence is
relevant only when the trend is shown to have resulted from prior
mergers rather than from normal competitive forces with which
Congress had no wish to interfere. The court's analysis, we submit,
confuses two wholly different points. It is quite true that section
7 was not intended to 'interfere' with 'normal competitive forces' or
to bar increases in concentration not attributable to mergers. But
here a merger is involved-an acquisition which artifically accentuates, to a significant degree, the trend of the industry in the direction of oligopoly. The only question here, therefore, is whether
the probable effect upon competition of the merger artifically
eliminating a substantial competitor is to be judged against the
background of the actual economic conditions in the industry or
as if they did not exist. Judge Tehan's ruling means, in substance,
that the probable effect of a merger upon competition must be
found to be the same whether it occurs in an industry characterized
by a large and constant number of small firms with frequent new
entrants to the market or in an industry in which there is a marked
trend towards oligopoly. Such a rule would not only be artificial,
it would also disregard the policy of Section 7. The disappearance
of numerous small, local companies, whether it be through acquisitions or through inability to compete effectively with their large
regional and national rivals, underscores the public importance of
barring combines destroying the independence of the strong and
viable companies which remain. If the existing trend toward concentration in the beer industry continues and the ranks of the small
brewers are still further depleted, the only hope of avoiding an
oligopolistic market structure dominated by a handful of giant concerns lies in the preservation of vigorous, medium-sized competitors
such as Blatz. Were there no such trend, the probable adverse effect of the same merger upon competition in the brewery industry

would be markedly less.
Our position upon this issue is supported by two analogous rulings by this Court. In United States v. PhiladelphiaNational Bank,
374 U.S. 321, 365 n.42, the Court stated that 'if concentration is already great, the importance of preventing even slight increases
in concentration and so preserving the possibility of eventual deconcentration is correspondingly great.' The point was re-affirmed
in United States v. Alcoa, 377 U.S. 271, 279, where the Court laid
stress upon the oligopolistic structure of the aluminum-conductor
market even though that structure was not primarily the consequence of prior acquisitions. In neither case did the Court inquire

into the causes of the concentration. By the same token, we sub-

mit, if concentration is rapidly increasing, the importance of preventing even slight additional increases is 'correspondingly great,'

and the causes of the existing condition are equally irrelevant.
So far as we know, this is the first case in which a court has
held that, in appraising the impact of a merger upon competition,
the existence of a strong trend toward concentration may be disregarded unless it stems from a prior history of mergers. That holding, we believe, is basically contrary to the purposes of the Clayton Act and should be reversed by this Court.
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firms, different courts might well have difficulty in anticipating
the results of the others.
STRANGERS

There is a disturbing tendency in recent cases to decree extreme remedies against strangers to the litigaton. Although in
theory a court must have jurisdiction over the person of a defendant to bind it by a judgment, 194 the same result may too
easily be accomplished indirectly by enjoining a defendant, for
example, from relocating, 195 continuing to employ 96 or hiring
third parties. 197 At some point such severe sanctions against
strangers invite objection-certainly on grounds of fairness and
perhaps on constitutional grounds. 198 Unless he is allowed to
appear as amicus curiae, however, the only way in which the
third party may object and appeal is to intervene. 99 When a
194. E.g., Sutphen Estates, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 19 (1951);
Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1941); Chase Nat'l Bank v.
Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431 (1934). See United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours
& Co., 177 F. Supp. 1, 12 (N.D. Ill. 1959), aff'd in part and vacated in part,
366 U.S. 316 (1961) (duPont II). Stockholders are indispensable parties if
the relief sought by the Government were to be granted directly against
them. Since they were not parties, relief could not be granted. The trial
had appointed amici curiae to represent the stockholders of General
Motors and duPont on the issue of relief. See 177 F. Supp. at 6. The positions of the amici curiae were carefully considered. They filed briefs in the
Supreme Court urging, unsuccessfully, affirmance of the trial court's remedial decree. 366 U.S. at 318.
195. United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 1962 Trade Cas.
70,380 (W.D.N.Y. 1962) (granting preliminary injunction), modified in
other respects, 1963 Trade Cas. 1170,693 (W.D.N.Y. 1963).
196. E.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I.
1964), prob. juris,noted, 381 U.S. 910 (1965).
197. E.g., United States v. Ingersoll Rand Co., 1964 Trade Cas.
71,074
(W.D.Pa. 1964) (ten year restriction). See also United States v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 1965 Trade Cas. 71,453 (D. Utah 1965).
198. The strongest case for arguing a violation of federal due process
under the fifth amendment would seem to be the facts presented by
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1965), prob. juris.
noted, 381 U.S. 910 (1965). There, the court enjoined any of the defendants
from employing after April 1, 1966, James Douglas Fleming, not a named
defendant, who had joined Grinnell in 1919 and had been its president since
1948 as well as a director of each of the four corporate defendants. However, the injunction would not "preclude any defendant from fulfilling any
pension or like financial agreement it now has with Mr. Fleming."
199. In several recent § 7 cases the court has allowed third parties to
be heard as amici curiae. E.g., United States v. Aluminum Ltd., 1965 Trade
Cas. 71,366 (D.N.J. 1965) (stranger given alternative of intervening or
being heard as amicus curiae). But an amicus curiae would presumably
have no standing to take the initiative in instituting an appeal. Such
standing if any would arise only by virtue of having been allowed to
intervene. E.g., United States v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 1965
Trade Cas.
71,452 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Or an appeal might be sought from a
denial of intervention. Of course, an appellate court might choose to hear a
question raised by an amicus curiae.
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stranger to an action takes over its defense, however, he becomes
2
bound by the judgment in the action. 11
ADVANCE FILING OF

CONSENT DECREES

In 1961 the Justice Department announced that in order "to
minimize any unforeseen effect" proposed consent decrees would
be made public at least thirty days before entered in court to
allow "competing firms and other persons and agencies to comment
and thereby to keep the Department and the court fully informed
as to all relevant facts."'20 1 The Department may withdraw its
consent if objections indicate that the judgment proposed is "inappropriate, improper or inadequate." The right to object to
intervention by anyone not a named party is reserved by the Department. Intervention by strangers in government-instituted antitrust cases previously had usually been denied, except where a
decree had expressly provided otherwise. 20 2 Objections to consent
decrees have, however, been heard as between co-defendants where
one party wished to settle, the other to litigate. 20 3 To date the
new policy does not seem to have had much
effect on antitrust
20 4
cases in general or merger cases in particular.
REVIEW

Questions of appealability in section 7 suits brought by the
Justice Department are governed largely, if not exclusively, by the
200. E.g., Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. Thermo, Inc., 116
F.2d 845, 846 (2d Cir. 1941); Tubular Textile Mach. Corp. v. Redman, 173
F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 267 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1959).
201. Justice Department Press Release, 26 Fed. Reg. 6026 (1961).
202. Compare Allen Calculators, Inc. v. National Cash Register Co.,
322 U.S. 137 (1944), with Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United States,
312 U.S. 502, 505 (1941).
See Comment, Consent Decrees and the Private
Action: An Antitrust Dilemma, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 627, 636 n.44 (1965).
203. E.g., United States v. Carter Prod., Inc., 211 F. Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y.
1962) (decree accepted); United States v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.,
1959 Trade Cas. 1169,300 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (decree rejected); United States
v. Borden Co., 1953 Trade Cas.
67,441 (D. Ill. 1953) (decree accepted).
204. Because the Expediting Act, 32 Stat. 823, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 28, 29 (1964), postpones all appeals until there is a final order, peculiar
situations can arise in a government-instituted antitrust case. In United
States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964), the Supreme Court
reversed the trial court and ordered divestiture without delay. A number
of third parties moved to intervene as of right or to be heard, in the alternative, as amicus curiae on the propriety of relief in connection with the
divestiture of the Pacific Northwest properties by El Paso Natural Gas Co.
The motions, opposed both by the Justice Department and by the defendant,
were denied. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 1965 Trade Cas.
71,362 (D. Utah 1965). After the case was apparently settled by consent
decree, United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 1965 Trade Cas.
71,453
(D. Utah) several of the would-be intervenors have appealed denial of
intervention to the Court. Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural
Gas. Co., appeal filed April 21, 1965; People v. United States, appeal filed
April 26, 1965.
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Expediting Act; 205 in suits brought by the FTC largely by the
Clayton Act; and in suits brought by private parties by the provisions of the Judicial Code. To judge from questions recently addressed by the courts which might also come up in merger cases,
it has sometimes proved to be extremely difficult to determine
whether a particular ruling falls under one heading or another.
In view of the ancillary relief called for by certain recent section
7 decrees, a third party with whom defendant is required to deal
might wish a construction of the decree obtained by the Government. If such a third party beneficiary is dissatisfied by a construction of an antitrust decree, does the appeal, if any, lie to the
circuit court or directly to the Supreme Court? 206
Suits Brought by the Government
The Expediting Act has been interpreted as prescribing the
exclusive avenue on which to appeal in a suit instituted by the
Justice Department. 207 An appeal under the Expediting Act is of
205. 32 Stat. 823, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 28 and 29 (1964).
206. If the controversy is "private," then the appeal would lie to the

circuit court. If the controversy sufficiently involves the government's case,
the appeal lies to the Supreme Court. The test is whether the controversy
is "inside or outside the mainstream of the litigation in which the government is directly concerned." Shenandoah Valley Broadcasting, Inc. v.
ASCAP, 375 U.S. 39, 40 (1963). The utility of that test is sufficiently illustrated by the travels of the parties to the case which announced the test.
The "All-Industry Television Station Music License Committee" applied to
the district court for an order determining the reasonable fee to be paid for
a music performance license on new terms desired by Committee, claiming
to be entitled to such relief under the amended final judgment entered on
consent in 1950 in the government's antitrust action against ASCAP, United
States v. ASCAP, 1950 Trade Cas.
62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
The district court ruled that it had no power under the consent decree
to compel ASCAP to issue a license on the terms demanded by Committee
and dismissed the application.
The Committee took appeals both to the Supreme Court under the Expediting Act and to the circuit court of appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(1964). The Supreme Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 371 U.S.
540 (1963) (per curiam). The appeal pending before the second circuit was
then dismissed, the court agreeing with ASCAP (and the Justice Department) that the Expediting Act deprived it of jurisdiction. 317 F.2d 90 (2d
Cir. 1963). On petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court summarily reversed and remanded the case to the Second Circuit. 375 U.S. 39 (1963).
On ASCAP's petition for rehearing, the Supreme Court amended its remand
to permit ASCAP to contend before the court of appeals that the Committee's appeal was untimely, having been filed less than 60, but more than
30, days after the trial court's decision. 375 U.S. 994 (1964). The second
circuit held the appeal timely and decided the case on its merits, affirming
the trial court's original determination that ASCAP was not required under
the consent decree to grant a license on terms dictated by the Committee.
331 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1964). Certiorari was denied. 377 U.S. 997 (1964).
The prudent appellant in a borderline case will file his appeal with
both the circuit court and the Supreme Court within a 30 day period.
207. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 305 & n.9 (1962).
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right directly to the Supreme Court, although such appeals are
often disposed of summarily. 20 8 By the terms of the act, an appeal will lie only from a "final order."2091 It follows that the
granting or denial of a preliminary injunction in a suit instituted
by the Justice Department
against a merger is probably not ap210
pealable to any court.
When is a decree sufficiently "final" to seek direct review by
the Supreme Court? This was the threshold issue in Brown Shoe,
where the district court had found the acquisition illegal but had
not formulated a plan of divestiture. 211 Largely for pragmatic reasons the majority of the Supreme Court held the ruling below
"final" and went on to discuss the substantive standards of legality
under section 7.212 Citation by the majority of the leading case
208.

E.g., Kennecott Copper Co. v. United States, 1965 Trade Cas.

71,458 (1965).
209. 38 Stat. 823, as amended 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1964) provides:

In every civil action brought in any district court of the United
States under any of said Acts [including, by the terms of 15 U.S.C.

§ 28, the Sherman Act and 'or any other Acts having a like purpose
that hereafter may be enacted'], wherein the United States is complainant, an appeal from the final judgment of the district court
will lie only to the Supreme Court.
210. See United States v. California Co-Op Canneries, 279 U.S. 553,
558 (1929); United States v. FMC Corp., 321 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1963), application for preliminary injunction pending cert. denied,
U.S.
(1963).
Contra, United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963)
(granting of preliminary injunction appealable by defendant under § 1292
(a) (1) of the Judicial Code). Note, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 592 (1964).

In the course of oral argument on the Justice Department's motion

to the third circuit for a temporary restraining order to permit full appeal
from a denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction in United States v.
Penick & Ford, Ltd., 1965 Trade Cas.
71,457 (D.N.J. 1965), Chief Judge
Biggs questioned government counsel as to its standing to appeal, and indicated that he now "entertain[s] very serious doubt as to the correctness of
the decision of the court, written by myself, in the Ingersoll-Rand case."
(Transcript of oral argument, p. 7). The court ducked the question by
simply denying the motion for a stay without opinion.

If § 1292(a) (1) of the Judicial Code, 62 Stat. 929 (1948), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a) (1964), is not an available avenue of interlocutory appeal in
government-instituted antitrust cases, what of the Federal Interlocutory
Appeals Act, 72 Stat. 1770 (1958), 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964)? The legislative history of the act, S. Rep. No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 5255-56 (1958),

may give some indication to its applicability. It would seem, however, that

the Federal Interlocutory Appeals Act is not available, again because of the
negative implications of the Expediting Act, in a government-instituted
antitrust suit. See Gessel, A Much Needed Reform-Repeal the Expediting
Act for Antitrust Cases, TRADE REG. REP. (1961 New York State Bar Assoc.
Antitrust Symposium) 98, 101 (1961); Solomon, Repeal of the Expediting
Act-A Negative View, TRADE REG. REP. (1961 New York State Bar Assoc.
Antitrust Symposium) 94, 95 (1961).
211. United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 179 F. Supp 721, 741-42 (E.D.
Mo. 1959).

212. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 304-11 (1962).
In holding the trial court's order "final," the majority rested on (1) the fact
that the trial court had passed on every prayer for relief in the complaint
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recognizing the "collateral order" doctrine as a basis for appeal 218
may indicate relaxation of the test of finality. Mr. Justice Harlan
dissented claiming that review of the substantive issue would require a second review of the propriety of relief and that runs
counter to the concept of one appeal from a final order contemplated by the Expediting Act. 214 Of course, a second appeal on
the issue of relief may well be called for when the trial court
initially finds the transaction legal and the Supreme Court reverses-as in duPont I and duPont II.
In rare situations, appeals have been heard in government antitrust cases without the aid of the Expediting Act.21 5 Thus, an
attack by the Justice Department on a merger in a regulated
industry might invite defensive use of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. If the defense is struck on a pretrial motion, an
immediate appeal to the Supreme Court might be sought on the
basis of the All-Writs Act.2 16 If primary jurisdiction does lie in
another forum, it seems particularly futile, considering the complexity as well as the expense in time and money of antitrust
litigation, to reach that conclusion only after an erroneous decision on the merits simply to arrive at a final order from which
to appeal.
Suits Instituted by the FTC
Interlocutory appeals from rulings of the Hearing Examiner
may be permitted "in extraordinary circumstances" by the FTC,
"where an immediate decision . . .is clearly necessary to prevent
detriment to the public interest. ' 21 7 An Examiner may also certify a question to the FTC for consideration. 218 The FTC's Rules
authorize the Hearing Examiner to make findings of fact and conclusions of law "which shall become the decision of the Commission," unless appealed to, stayed by or docketing sua sponte by,
the FTC within 30 days.2 19 Under the current procedure, both
sides have an appeal as of right to the FTC from the Hearing
and left open only the details of divestiture;

(2)

postponement would

prejudice the interest of the public and the parties because it might entail a
change in market conditions rendering divestiture impractical; and (3) the
implications of having previously allowed appeals in similar circumstances.
213. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
214. 370 U.S. at 357-65.
215. See Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952);
De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212 (1945); United States
Alkali Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196 (1945).

216. Compare United States Alkali Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S.
196 (1945).

217. 1963 FTC Rules of Practice § 3.20, 16 C.F.R. § 3.20 (1963). See,
e.g., Consolidated Foods Corp., 56 F.T.C. 1663 (1960).
218. 1963 FTC Rules of Practice § 3.15(c) (9), 16 C.F.R. § 3.15(c) (9)
(1963).
219. 1963 FTC Rules of Practice §§ 3.21(a) & 3.23, 16 C.F.R. §§ 3.21(a)
& 3.23 (1963).
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Examiner's initial decision. 220 The FTC has recently indicated
that important or novel questions in the merger area should not
be decided by a bare quorum .221
On occasion the FTC has curtly ruled that a section 7 complaint should be dropped even though the evidence would support
the violation alleged. 222 Such dispositions have been criticized
on the ground that the FTC failed to spell out its reasons: "Why
is the Commission so inarticulate when it is dismissing complaints?
One cannot help but suspect that it is reluctant to make or adopt
any statements which may be of some
precedential value to a
223
respondent in a subsequent proceeding.
If the FTC finds an acquisition illegal, it invites both the
staff and the respondent to submit recommendations as to appropriate relief. 224 After the FTC has rendered a decision, any
party has 20 days to ask for reconsideration but such petition
must be limited to new questions not already argued before the
FTC, and the filing of the petition does not stay the effective
date of the order or toll any statutory time period, unless the
FTC so orders. 225 A cease and desist order issued by the FTC
under section 7 becomes final unless appealed within 60 days to
226
the appropriate circuit court.
The FTC has argued that in view of its "specialization and
expertise," the power of the circuit court to review its decisions
should be more limited than the usual scope of review for a decision of a district court. This argument was rejected in Crown
Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 227 and accepted in A. G. Spalding & Bros.,
Inc. v. FTC.228 The Spalding court relied on Clayton Act section 11
which provides that the "findings of the Commission . . . as to the
facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. '229
A decision of the circuit court may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by certiorari.2 30 Where the FTC is the party wishing
to appeal a circuit court decision, it faces the problem of persuad231
ing the Solicitor-General that an appeal should be taken.
The proper scope of review of an FTC determination that a
220.
221.
222.

1963 FTC Rules of Practice, § 3.22, 16 C.F.R. § 3.22 (1963).
National Tea Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 17,242 (FTC 1965).
Dresser Indus., Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (1963-1965 Transfer Binder)

16,513 (FTC 1963).
223. Barton, The Federal Trade Commission and the Need for Procedural Impartiality,64 COLUM. L. REV. 390, 398 (1964).
224. 1963 FTC Rules of Practice § 3.24(c), 16 C.F.R. § 3.24(c) (1963).
225. 1963 FTC Rules of Practice § 3.25, 16 C.F.R. § 3.25 (1963).
226. 73 Stat. 243 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1964).
227. 296 F.2d 800, 815 n.11 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 937
(1962).
228. 301 F.2d 585, 624-25 (3d Cir. 1962).
229. 38 Stat. 734, as amended, 73 Stat. 43 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1964).
230. Ibid.

231.

See 28 C.F.R. 0.20 (1965).
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merger violates section 7 has been considerably muddied by Consolidated Foods. 232 There the Hearing Examiner had based his
finding of illegality on specified instances of reciprocity. The FTC
affirmed on a theory which came very close to announcing that
the mere opportunity for reciprocity sufficed to condemn this
merger.233 In reversing the circuit court 234 the Supreme Court
adopted the FTC's view; 235 Mr. Justice Stewart concurred on a
theory not previously considered; 236 and Mr. Justice Harlan wrote
that he concurred on Stewart's premises with "one reservation:"
To the extent that anything in his opinion might be
taken as drawing on evidence upon which the Commission
indicated no reliance, I could not subscribe to that approach. This Court must review administrative findings
as they are made by the agency concerned, and if the evidence will not support the findings and theory upon which
the agency acted, an affirmance of the agency's order cannot 3 7properly rest upon a reassessment of the record by
2
US.

In the first application of Consolidated Foods, a trial court evidently treated Stewart's
premises as the law of the case, ignoring
2 38
the majority opinion.
Private Actions
In private actions involving section 7 ,jurisdiction is based
upon the Clayton Act and questions of appealability are governed by general rules. The granting or denial of a preliminary
injunction is immediately appealable to the circuit court. 2,19 Other
interlocutory questions may be certified to the circuit court by
the trial judge under the Federal Interlocutory Appeals Act.240
Appeals from final orders of the trial court also go to the circuit
court 241 and thence, perhaps, by certiorari to the Supreme
2 42

Court.

232.

TRADE REG. REP. (1961-1963 Transfer Binder)

15,662 (Hearing

Examiner).
233.
234.
235.

TRADE REG. REP. (1961-1963 Transfer Binder)

236.
237.

Id. at 607-08.
Id. at 601.

16,362 (FTC 1963).

329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1964).
380 U.S. 592 (1965) (Douglas. J.).

238. United States v. Penick & Ford, Ltd. 1965 Trade Cas.
71,457
(D.N.J. 1965). Cf. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 1965 Trade
Cas.
71,518 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
239. See 62 Stat. 929 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1) (1964).
240. E.g., Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 185 F. Supp.
826, 831 (M.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd, 281 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied.
364 U.S. 901 (1960).
241. See 62 Stat. 929 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1964).
242. See 62 Stat. 928 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1964).
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ENFORCEMENT

Judgments in government-instituted actions finding a viola243
tion of section 7 are enforceable by contempt proceedings.
Once an order in a section 7 proceeding brought by the FTC becomes final, it is enforceable by penalty proceedings. 244 Penalty
proceedings are instituted by the Justice Department. 245 Unlike
orders issued under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, 246 penalty proceedings in aid of a Clayton Act order apparently do not contemplate a prior formal FTC proceeding to determine that the order has in fact been violated. 247 If the order has
been affirmed and "enforced" by a circuit
court, it can probably
248
be the basis for a contempt proceeding.
Private parties, however, have no standing to enforce a decree
entered in a suit instituted by the government, by asking the
court to punish defendant for contempt. 49 It is not clear whether
a contempt or penalty0 proceeding may be the basis for a private
25
treble damage claim.
243. Compare In re Transamerica Corp., 184 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 883 (1950); see also Board of Governors v. Transamerica Corp., 184 F.2d 326 (9th Cir. 1950).
244. See Clayton Act §11(1), 38 Stat. 734 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 21(1)
(1964) (penalty of not more than $5,000 for each violation with each day of
a continuing violation being deemed a separate offense).
The legislative
history suggests that maximum penalties are particularly appropriate in
enforcing merger orders. See H.R. Rep. No. 580, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 14
(1959).
245. Such an action is instituted in a federal district court, which has
jurisdiction under 62 Stat. 933 (1948), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1345 & 1395 (1964).
246. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as
amended 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
247. Enforcement of § 5 orders contemplate certification to the Attorney-General by the FTC of the facts of the violation of the order. See
52 Stat. 114 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 56 (1964).
But such certification is not a
jurisdictional fact. United States v. St. Regis Paper Co., 1965 Trade Cas.
71,379 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). There is no provision comparable to this procedure relating to Clayton § 7 orders.
248. Whether a contempt proceeding might be an alternative sanction
to a penalty proceeding, in aid of an FTC order which had become final
simply through lapse of time (rather than by judicial affirmance and enforcement) is not clear. For the suggestion that this might involve "invasion of the constitutionally separate powers of the judiciary" see Austern,
Five Thousand Dollars A Day: An Inquiry Into the Civil Penalty Consequences of Violation of a Federal Trade Commission Cease and Desist
Order,21 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 285, 326 (1962).
249. United States v. ASCAP, 1965 Trade Cas. 71,394 (2d Cir. 1965),
motions to dismiss granted sub. nom. Metromedia, Inc. v. ASCAP, 1965
Trade Cas. 71,574 (Supreme Court 1965). (per curiam).
250. Query, whether a judgment entered on a plea of guilty in a
criminal contempt proceeding for violation of a consent decree settling a
Sherman Act case, is a judgment in an action under the antitrust laws for
the purposes of Clayton § 5? See Sinco Sales Serv. v. Air Reduction Co.,
213 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (plea of nolo contendere).
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CONCLUSION

This general review of current trends in relief illustrates the
great virtue of equitable remedies: the extraordinary flexibility,
methods by which a market may be
given some imagination, of 251
"pried open to competition."
The decrees in decided cases also
serve as precedent for preventive antitrust. Such "housecleaning"
should be encouraged by the enforcement agencies.
Questions of standing to sue cannot be decided by fixed categories: two given acquisitions could have very different competitive consequences. What, for example, might be very incidental
injury to a supplier of a competitor, in one context might have
serious and immediate consequences to a supplier of a competitor
in another context.
If legality of an acquisition turns entirely upon the probable
consequences to the market as it exists at the time of the transaction, then it can be argued that treble damages are illogical. This
implies that if an acquisition passes section 7 standards at the time
it is consummated, it is home free. Section 7, however, has no
such transitory test. If an acquisition is attacked years after the
event, it would be strange not to examine post-acquisition developments for evidence of likely anticompetitive effect. So long as
post-acquisition evidence is relevant, as it should be, that evidence
may show actual injury. In such a case treble damages should be
recognized as an available form of private relief. Conversely,
while merely probable anticompetitive consequences may suffice
to make out a violation, as would be the case when an attack was
made on a pending merger, and support injunctive relief, the fact
of injury sufficient to bear the weight of a claim for treble damages should require a showing of actual anticompetitive consequences to a private plaintiff.
As to issues of preliminary relief, it should be enough to raise
serious doubts to meet the required showing of probable violation.
On the issue of irreparable injury, however, either preliminary
injunctions should be readily "negotiable" with a Brown Shoe
order or should be granted only on a showing of real obstacles to
effective relief.
There is little point-particularly with a merger-in attacking
a transaction without a workable theory of relief already in hand.
The lengthy Continental Can litigation seems to have added nothing very lucid to legal doctrine, 25 2 and may, itself, have resulted
251. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 401 (1947).
252. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964):
[The majority of the Court] chooses . . . to invent a line of commerce and existence of which no one, not even the Government, has
imagined; for which businessmen and economists will look in vain;
a line of commerce which sprang into existence only when the
merger took place and will cease to exist when the merger is un-
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in lessened competition in the container industry. 253 Might the
Justice Department have anticipated difficulty in finding a buyer
done. I have no idea where § 7 goes from here, nor will businessmen or the antitrust bar.
Id. at 476-77 (Harlan, J., dissenting). For a critical analysis of some of the
recent Supreme Court decisions in the merger field, see Handler & Robinson, The Supreme Court v. CorporateMergers, FORTUNE 164 (Jan. 1965).
253. The Government initially attempted to block the acquisition by
invoking a consent decree which had been entered against Continental in
1950 in a civil antitrust suit under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act in a district court. United States v. Continental
Can Co., 1950 Trade Cas. 1 62,680 (N.D. Cal. 1950). In August 1956, the
court held that the consent decree did not cover the proposed acquisition.
143 F. Supp. 787 (N.D.Cal. 1956). An independent proceeding was filed in
September 1956. The Justice Department's motion for a temporary injunction was promptly and curtly denied. 1956 Trade Cas. f 68,479 (S.D.N.Y.
1956). At the conclusion of the Government's lengthy case at trial, the
court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, announcing its
decision that the merger was legal, orally, and indicating that a written
opinion would follow. See United States v. Continental Can Co., 217 F.
Supp. 761, 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). The trial court took almost two years to
hand down a written decision. In the meantime the Supreme Court decided
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). The Government
moved for a re-hearing, which was denied. 217 F. Supp. 761, at 765-66.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the merger was held illegal, 378 U.S. 441
(1964), eight years after the transaction had been initially attacked.
Hazel-Atlas Glass Company had been reasonably profitable up to the
time of its acquisition. It had been the third largest domestic glass container manufacturer and showed net profits of not less than $2,956,000 a
year during the period 1951-1955. It is understood, however, that Continental Can Company had been losing some 5 to 8 million dollars a year in
its Hazel-Atlas operation. Continental cannot have been entirely unhappy
about getting out of the Hazel-Atlas operation, and no one outside the industry evidently was prepared to buy it.
In order to undo the acquisition, Continental proposed to sell eight of
the eleven Hazel-Atlas plants to Brockway Glass Company, Inc., the fourth
largest glass container manufacturer. The Justice Department was evidently unable to come up with a rival offer. Karmin, "Trust Buster's Lot
Not a Happy One," The Wall Street Journal,June 17, 1965, p. 12, col. 3. The
consideration was 1,000,000 shares of newly-created Brockway non-voting
Class B stock which has limited dividend rights for a period of ten years or
until earnings exceed a figure which is more than twice Brockway's previous highest annual earnings. Brockway Class B stock may be converted to
Class A stock on a share-for-share basis after Class B stock becomes eligible
for dividends. But Continental agreed that it would convert only in connection with a public offering or a distribution of Brockway stock to Continental stockholders. In return Continental not only conveyed title to
eight glass plants with a book value of some 21 million dollars and current
assets amounting to some $13.6 million, but it also paid Brockway $2,800,000
to cover transitional deficit.
That left three plants. One Continental agreed to sell. But the tenth
and the eleventh it successfully argued that it should be allowed to keep.
One was a pressed glassware plant, at Clarksburg, West Virginia-a depressed area-employing some 1900 employees, a large proportion of whom
had 25 years or more of service. This plant, although a significant factor
in pressed glass, had been losing money for years and had only just gotten
above the break-even point. The buildings were old and although much
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prepared to rush in where an experienced factor in the container
industry was unable to succeed? If the merger never was successful, is it so clear that it was probably anticompetitive?
Economic considerations are obviously the primary factor in
issues of relief: the relief must be made to work. To avoid litigation that is futile or worse, economic considerations must come
to play a larger role in refining the standards of legality. Increased efficiency should not by itself be an antitrust violation.
Rather it254should be a defense both on the merits and on questions
of relief.
had been spent in a rehabilitation program, much remained to be spent.
The uncertain future had already caused some skilled workmen-in short
supply-to leave. Two buyers had come forward for the glass plant-one,
an individual with necessarily "speculative" proposals and Anchor Hocking, the largest manufacturer of pressed glass tableware with some 30% of
that market. The Anchor Hocking proposal itself raised questions under
§ 7. The final plant was a metal closure plant in Wheeling, West Virginiaalso a depressed area-employing 340 people, again many with long service.
Continental's President had indicated a willingness to spend as much as 5
million dollars over the next five years to modernize the Clarksburg plant.
After considering these factors the Court concluded that Continental
should not be required to offer the plants for sale, as requested by the Justice Department. United States v. Continental Can Co., 1964 Trade Cas.
1 71,264 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). The court did require Continental to make express representations "that it will continue to maintain these ventures as
efficient competitive enterprises and take such steps as may be necessary
for their continued efficient operation and modernization and expansion."
Id. at 80,143. In view of Continental's experience in the glass container
business this may be no small undertaking.
Hazel-Atlas then proved an expensive investment for Continental. The
transaction gave rise to some questionable law. But the cream of the jest
is that in the name of competition, the fourth ranking glass bottle manufacturing company is allowed to purchase what had been the third largest
glass container manufacturer and thereby became the second ranking firm
in the industry. Assuming that the Supreme Court's decision was correct,
does the result argue for less stringent standards for granting temporary
injunctions? Does it argue for some form of final relief other than divestiture? Should the Justice Department have explored the practical problems
of relief before taking an appeal to the Supreme Court?
254. In Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1313, 1339 (1965), the view is expressed, on the one
hand, that "economics of sale in production, distribution, research, and the
like should in no event be a factor militating against the lawfulness of

conglomerate (or other) mergers," but, on the other hand, "difficulties in
proof indicate that, generally speaking, economies should probably not be a
defense on a case-by-case basis to acquisitions that would otherwise be
prohibited." If the first premise is acceptable, why should it be so difficult to submit proof that prospective economies affirmatively justify a
merger? In United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576
(S.D.N.Y. 1958), it was contended that the acquisition of Youngstown
would permit Bethlehem to expand into the middle west (a deficit steel
production area) at a far lower cost than building a new plant. The merger
was nonetheless held illegal largely because of the trend toward concentration in the steel industry, notwithstanding that Bethlehem-Youngstown
would have been much smaller than U.S. Steel. Presumably, Turner

would applaud the rejection of the efficiency defense, although it was
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A philosophy of relief based on divestiture rather than injunction may come much closer to the competitive ideal. If
divestiture, however, is to be regarded as the usual remedy for
horizontal mergers under section 7, it should represent a balance
between the need to check the disproportionate economic power
which the merger is found likely to bring about and the virtues of
increased efficiency. This points to a number of conclusions. Beyond capital replacements financed by conventional allowances for
depreciation of the property acquired, after-acquired property
should not automatically be involved in divestiture. The option to
decide what property to divest should be offered more freely to
defendants. Conversely, compelling defendant to divest property
not acquired in a transaction subject to section 7 should require a
Sherman Act test.
With regard to vertical mergers, only rarely will integration
itself be the vice. A vertical merger is simply a more permanent form of integration than requirements or bulk sales contracts or a running series of spot sales induced by price discounts. 255 To test an outright purchase of a supplier or customer
by asking whether any less restrictive arrangement might not
serve all the legitimate needs of the parties seems quite unrealistic. 256 If there is fear that competitors may be foreclosed
from a very limited source of supply or from key outlets, it
should be possible to experiment with some method of dedicating
a part of the supply or the outlet to such competitors. Only if
such allocation proves unworkable, should divestiture be ordered.
Relief under section 7 against conglomerate mergers involves
particularly troublesome questions. It is submitted that rather
than approach acquisitions of "know-how" with divestiture in
mind, it is better to fashion methods of sharing the "know-how"
equitably.
It is important to distingush between holding an arrangement
illegal because it may create a distortion in a market and holding
it illegal because it permits a company to take advantage of
presented in some detail and was compelling enough as a business matter
to recommend the merger to the parties. Is Turner's difficulty based on
the implicit premise that such a defense would be relevant only where
economies would be enjoyed by both parties and could arise in no other way
except by merger? If so, then such conditions could rarely be met and
the defense is impracticable. Youngstown did expand and presumably
availed itself of most of the available economies resulting from building on
to an old plant as compared with starting from scratch. Behlehem ultimately built in the midwest. But why should it be necessary to show that
economies would arise for both parties in no other possible way? Or would
Turner say that this is an example of an otherwise illegal merger? Perhaps
the problem lies in Turner's failure to make explicit the conditions under
which a merger "would otherwise be prohibited."
255. See Kessler & Stern, Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L. J. 1 (1959).
256. Compare White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 270
(1963).

Fall 1965]

CLAYTON ACT SECTION 7

existing imperfections in surrounding markets. Procter & Gamble
is an example of the second theory. It is, however, a theory that
can be defended only on the ground that the acquiring company
takes its newly acquired competitors as it finds them. Rather
than bar a strong company from a stagnant market, would it not
be better to address the imperfections directly, if need be through
new legislation? If a market with some uncompetitive aspects
can be made worse by letting a stranger buy his way into it, it
might also be made better.
The relief should bear as close a relationship as possible to
the anticompetitive consequences found likely. To assume that
a merger is bad because it might permit defendant to engage in
overt anticompetitive conduct, is a non sequitur-a position
which the FTC came very close to adopting in Consolidated
Foods, and, more recently, the approach urged by the Justice
Department in United States v. Penick & Ford, Ltd.2 57 Where
there is evidence of anticompetitive conduct which bears little or
no necessary relationship to the structure of the marketplace, it
would seem that an injunction should suffice. An example of
post-acquisition conduct not necessarily amenable to injunctive
relief, by contrast, might be a price squeeze by a fully integrated
company against customers only partially integrated.
It may be questioned whether the FTC has the power to enjoin future acquisitions where it lacks the power to obtain preliminary injunctions. This argument, however, may be academic.
If relief is not punitive, then in theory the FTC or a court is
only restoring competitive balance to the market. Therefore,
any acquisition of similar assets in the near future, perhaps five
years, would almost certainly be illegal.
Industry-wide enforcement, including "guide-lines," may be an
experiment worth trying. The utility of any set formula purporting to regulate in some fashion the share of market which any
competitor may enjoy with the aid of one or more acquisitions is
doubtful: what the economy always needs is not the rule but
the exception. 25 8 The extraordinary success of acquisition programs such as Litton's 25 9 illustrates that able management can
still navigate the shoals of section 7.
257.

1965 Trade Cas.

71,457 (D.N.J. 1965), motion for stay to permit

full appeal denied without opinion, (3d Cir. 1965).

258. This is to say only that the nation's antitrust policy is hardly promoted by encouraging competitors to cultivate the quiet life, or "live and
let live." A merger which is likely to produce hard competition is in theory

to be encouraged. It is not to say, of course, that monopolization should
be encouraged. At the bottom of our antitrust policy lingers something of
a contradiction: "It is a paradox of economics that competition if successful, may produce monopoly."

McCallister, Section 2(b) of Robinson-Pat-

man (1946 New York State Bar Ass'n Section on Food, Drug & Cosmetic
Law Symposium) 23 (1946).
259.

Spotlight on Business: The Fastest Billion in U.S. Business,
60 (Aug. 23, 1965).
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